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This is the fi rst installment of a two-part essay. Limitations of space 
prevented the publication of the full essay in present issue of the Jour-
nal. The second installment will appear in the next issue, 2021 (1). My 
overall goal is to outline a strategy for integrating generative linguistics 
with a broadly pragmatist approach to meaning and communication. 
Two immensely useful guides in this venture are Robert Brandom and 
Paul Pietroski. Squarely in the Chomskyan tradition, Pietroski’s recent 
book, Conjoining Meanings, offers an approach to natural-language 
semantics that rejects foundational assumptions widely held amongst 
philosophers and linguists. In particular, he argues against extensional-
ism—the view that meanings are (or determine) truth and satisfaction 
conditions. Having arrived at the same conclusion by way of Brandom’s 
defl ationist account of truth and reference, I’ll argue that both theorists 
have important contributions to make to a broader anti-extensionalist 
approach to language. What appears here as Part 1 of the essay is large-
ly exegetical, laying out what I see as the core aspects of Brandom’s nor-
mative inferentialism (§1) and Pietroski’s naturalistic semantics (§2). 
In Part 2 (next issue), I argue that there are many convergences between 
these two theoretical frameworks and, contrary to fi rst appearances, very 
few points of substantive disagreement between them. If the integration 
strategy that I propose is correct, then what appear to be sharply con-
trasting commitments are better seen as interrelated verbal differences 
that come down to different—but complementary—explanatory goals. 
The residual disputes are, however, stubborn. I end by discussing how to 
square Pietroski’s commitment to predicativism with Brandom’s argu-
ment that a predicativist language is in principle incapable of express-
ing ordinary conditionals.
Keywords: Generative linguistics, anti-extensionalism, normativ-
ity, inferentialism, predicativism, public language, communication.
* My deepest thanks to Daniel Harris, Ryan DeChant, Elmar Unnsteinsson, 
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Introduction
I take it that the correct approach to natural-language syntax is the 
one that Noam Chomsky outlined as early as the 1950s and, along with 
many others, has continually refi ned over the past seven decades. The 
ongoing research program of generative linguistics that his syntactic 
theorizing inspired has, in the fullness of time, yielded a diversity of 
impressive results. These include exciting and previously unimaginable 
empirical discoveries about the human capacity for language, both in 
broad scope—e.g., recursive generability and the principles-and-parame-
ters model—and at the level of fi ne-structure (e.g., traces, parasitic gaps, 
etc.). However, as a theorist interested not only in syntax but also in 
semantics, I fi nd myself in a diffi cult and somewhat awkward position.
Not to complain, but, you see, I happen to have learned my seman-
tics from the work of Robert Brandom, and it’s safe to say that I’ve 
drunk the Kool-Aid that he served up in his magnum opus, Making It 
Explicit. Having thus bought into both Chomsky’s generative grammar 
and Brandom’s normative inferentialism, I now fi nd myself facing the 
daunting challenge of bridging the apparent chasm between the two. 
It may be that I’m utterly alone in this quandary, but in the course 
of the present discussion, I hope—perhaps somewhat perversely—to 
draw others into it as well.
There may never be an academic conference addressing the common 
themes and shared commitments of generative linguistics and norma-
tive inferentialism. For all that, the differences between them are, I be-
lieve, more boring—i.e., verbal or sociological—than is widely assumed. 
In what follows, I’ll argue that, contrary to fi rst appearances, there are 
actually very few points of substantive disagreement between them. 
The residual differences are stubborn, to be sure, but this can only be 
appreciated after a suitably wide collection of background agreements 
is put into place. I devote the fi rst half of the present discussion to this 
latter task.
Squarely in the Chomskyan tradition, Paul Pietroski’s recent book, 
Conjoining Meanings, offers an approach to natural-language seman-
tics that rejects foundational assumptions widely held amongst phi-
losophers and linguists. In particular, he argues against the view that 
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said, if some of what I claim here is false, then these people are all partly to blame. 
Ditto for cases where I say something awkwarder than usual; they should of caught 
that. My sincere gratitude, lastly, to all of the participants at the two symposia at 
which I was fortunate to present earlier versions of these ideas, including the 2018 
Croatian Meaning Workshop. From the latter group, I owe special thanks to Paul 
Pietroski (obviously), Michael Devitt, John Collins, Anna Drożdżowicz, and, most of 
all, to Dunja Jutronić—not only for inviting me to participate in the workshop, but 
for her saintly and near-inexhaustible patience with me throughout this project. 
Many thanks also to Nenad Miščević for allowing the second half of the present 
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meanings are, or even determine, extensions. The latter include such 
familiar semantic properties as truth conditions, satisfaction condi-
tions, and denotation/reference. Having arrived at the same conclusion 
by way of Brandom’s defl ationist account of truth (§1.3), I began to 
glimpse the possibility of a fruitful merger of ideas. The present essay 
represents a fi rst pass at integrating the generative linguist’s empirical 
insights about human psychology with the broadly pragmatist frame-
work about mind and language. I’ll argue that both have important 
contributions to make to our overall understanding of language. The 
easy part is spelling out what; the harder part is assessing the residual 
disagreements.
Here’s the overall plan:
In §1, I survey a range of core commitments that jointly constitute 
Brandom’s philosophical project—most centrally, his normative prag-
matics, inferentialist semantics, and substitutional syntax. Along the 
way, I note his intellectual debts to David Lewis, including the large-
scale explanatory goals that animate Brandom’s inquiry. These, I later 
argue, are in many ways orthogonal to Pietroski’s concerns. The latter 
claim fi gures in my broader argument that the two approaches can be 
fruitfully combined, potential protests from both sides notwithstanding.
In §2, I outline Pietroski’s position, focusing on his explanatory 
aims, his empirical methodology, and the substance of his proposal for a 
theory of human semantic competence. I take up Pietroski’s arguments 
against Lewis’s approach to natural language, with the aim of show-
ing that Brandom’s theoretical goals differ suffi ciently from Lewis’s 
to inoculate him against Pietroski’s criticisms. Turning to Pietroski’s 
discussions of Frege, I point out that his work in cognitive science un-
dercuts some of Brandom’s claims in “Why Philosophy Has Failed Cog-
nitive Science”. As we’ll see, far from ignoring Frege, Pietroski incor-
porates many of his insights into an empirical account of psychological 
processes. Nevertheless, some of the Fregean lessons that Brandom 
emphasizes do not seem to have moved Pietroski. In later sections, I 
explore some possible reasons for this.
This will conclude Part 1 of the essay. Limitations of space pre-
vented the publication of the full essay in present issue of the Journal. 
The second installment will appear in the next issue, 2021 (1). Here is 
a preview of what it contains:
I devote §3 to a survey of the core commitments that Pietroski 
and Brandom have in common. As already noted, both reject truth-
conditional semantics and seek to develop alternative frameworks 
for semantic theorizing. Similarly, I’ll point out, the alternatives they 
propose can both be seen as taking referential purport to be the distinc-
tive feature of language. This contrasts with received views in (meta)
semantics that focus, in the fi rst instance, on referential success, leav-
ing reference failure (e.g., empty names) for special treatment, as a 
blessedly rare “defective” case. This is related, I suspect, to the further 
convergence between the Brandom and the Pietroski on the proper 
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treatment of the distinction between de dicto and de re constructions. 
Last, but no less important, is their common rejection of the idea that 
communication requires an identity between the meanings expressed 
by a speaker and those grasped by the hearer. I’ll note that this shared 
commitment undercuts some of the main arguments against meaning 
holism—an inherent feature of Brandom’s inferentialist account.
A discussion of the differences between Pietroski and Brandom oc-
cupies the remainder of the essay. At fi rst glance, the contrast between 
them seems as vivid as any in the fi eld. Brandom’s project is explicitly 
normative, pursued largely from the armchair, and aims to provide an 
account of concept users as such—not just humans, but any conceiv-
able concept-mongering creature (or artifi cial system). By contrast, 
Pietroski’s project is avowedly descriptive, constrained by empirical 
data, and aims to provide an account of actual humans—particular-
ly, the “Slangs” that they naturally produce and consume. (Pietroski 
uses ‘Slang’ as a catch-all term for the natural languages that chil-
dren acquire.) These differences ramify quickly. For instance, Bran-
dom’s focus on social practices of communication seems to be at odds 
with Pietroski’s “individualistic” methodology, which is characteristic 
of generativist views more broadly (Chomsky 2000; Collins 2012). This 
contrast seems particularly sharp in light of Brandom’s commitment 
to the existence of (something like) public languages—at least in the 
sense of productive and fl exible norms governing the communal prac-
tice of “giving and asking for reasons” (GOGAR). All of these issues are 
discussed in §4, with the aim of gradually blunting the force of what 
initially appear to be quite sharp differences.
If one insists on seeing Brandom’s and Pietroski’s inquiries as tar-
geting a common subject matter, then one is sure to view the differ-
ences between them as substantive theoretical disagreements. They do, 
after all, use the same term, ‘language’, which at least suggests that 
they’re talking about one and the same phenomenon. But this way of 
viewing the situation is optional, at best. We’ve learned by now to stop 
assuming that theorists are targeting the same phenomenon simply 
on account of their using homophonous terms. Two theorists can press 
the same bit of folk vocabulary, e.g., ‘meaning’ or ‘concept’, into more 
weighty theoretical labor in quite different ways. That being so, one 
can just as well see the inferentialist and the generativist as address-
ing different (though undoubtedly related) topics—each providing in-
sights about his chosen domain of inquiry, and leaving the rest of us 
to wonder how those insights might be integrated, or at least brought 
to bear on one another. This is the strategy I’ll recommend throughout 
the present discussion.
In arguing that the two are, at the very least, logically compatible, 
one owes an account—or, at a minimum, a broad sketch of an account—
of the theoretical relation between them. The proposal that I’ll de-
velop is that Brandom’s explanatory ambitions differ from Pietroski’s 
in precisely the ways that are paradigmatic of “inter-level theoretical 
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relations”. My suggestion is that Brandom is attempting to furnish a 
high-level description of a quite general phenomenon—language use, 
as such. This presupposes that lower-level implementations of the rele-
vant generalizations can vary widely.1 Pietroski’s theoretical aims are, 
though certainly more exciting from an empirical standpoint, a good bit 
narrower than Brandom’s, in that they deal exclusively with the hu-
man case. As with any lower-level account of a more general phenom-
enon, Pietroski’s view is compatible, in principle with any number of 
higher-level descriptions of language. Thus, while it’s incorrect—or, at 
any rate, misleading—to say that the two accounts are strictly orthogo-
nal to one another, the fact is that each places very few constraints 
on the other. It should be surprising, then, when we fi nd substantive 
points of contact between them, whether these be points of contention 
or convergence.
Still, even if my suggestion is right that the two frameworks are 
more compatible than might initially appear, we must face up to the 
residual differences that credibly threaten my reconciling project. The 
most stubborn of these, which I accordingly leave to the very end, has 
to do with Pietroski’s arguments for a specifi c version of predicativ-
ism—roughly, the view that all subsentential entities are best treated 
as predicates, not (say) singular terms (§2.4). To be sure, Pietroski’s 
commitment to this view is not a central aspect of the overall genera-
tivist enterprise. Rather, it’s a tendentious empirical hypothesis, for 
which he offers correspondingly forceful arguments. That being so, if 
it were to turn out that the hypothesis is false, generative linguistics 
would go on without a hitch. Still, I focus on this issue because it raises 
much larger questions about how to treat subsentential entities, not 
just at the level of semantics, but also at the level of syntax.
The notion of syntax that Brandom employs is substitutional—not 
in the sense of “substitutional quantifi cation” (though he endorses that 
too, on independent grounds), but, rather, in the sense that he takes 
sentences, i.e., expressions of full thoughts, to be the primary vehicles 
of meaning. On his view, subsentential items (words, morphemes, etc.) 
are the products of taking a “substitutional scalpel” to the antecedent-
ly-interpreted sentential unities. We’ll take a fi rst stab at unpacking 
the scalpel metaphor in §1.5, and then come back to it in more detail in 
§4.3. While this substitutional approach may have a home in a Fregean 
semantics—Pietroski’s powerful arguments notwithstanding—there is 
no obvious sense in which it can be legitimately applied to the syntax 
of human languages.
The trick that I pull repeatedly throughout the second half of this 
essay—namely, that of relegating the two inquiries to distinct theoreti-
cal “levels”—doesn’t get much of a grip here. For, it’s a requirement of 
any such picture that an account pitched at the (relatively) higher level 
1 Indeed, as Fodor (1975) points out, without substantive constraints from the 
higher-level account, such “realization bases” might differ indefi nitely.
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of analysis should be compatible, at least in core respects, with any low-
er-level account of the “realization base”. But Brandom’s substitutional 
syntax seems, even upon close scrutiny, to be not only different from 
generative grammar, but decidedly at odds with it. I strongly suspect 
that this different comes down to a methodological confl ict between the 
generativist’s “bottom-up” treatment of subsentential items and the 
inferentialist’s “top-down” alternative.2 In §4, I discuss and evaluate 
some ways of viewing this disagreement, arriving ultimately at the fol-
lowing bittersweet conclusions.
Despite strong grounds for optimism about the possibility of inte-
grating normative inferentialism with the up-and-running research 
program of generative linguistics, it must be admitted that rendering 
Brandom’s substitutional approach to syntax compatible with the go-
ing theories in generative grammar (e.g., Chomsky’s minimalist pro-
gram) presents an obstinate challenge. Though I can think of no reason 
that the challenge is insuperable in principle, it’s nevertheless the case 
that I am not, at present, equipped to meet it myself. Perhaps others 
can do better in this regard—a task I invite, encourage, and exhort 
philosophers of language to undertake, on the strength of the positive 
arguments adduced here.
1. Brandom: From normative pragmatics to 
inferentialist semantics (and back)
Introduction
Robert Brandom’s philosophical project is grand in both scope and am-
bition.3 The resulting theoretical framework has a number of moving 
parts, to put it mildly. In this section, I’ll lay out what I take to be the 
central commitments of his “normative inferentialism”, with particular 
focus on those that pertain to the broader goals of this discussion—i.e., 
the proposal to integrate the generativist and inferentialist research 
programs.
Although this section is intended to be largely exegetical, postpon-
ing critical evaluation to §4, I should emphasize that it wouldn’t matter 
to me very much if Brandom wouldn’t put things quite the way that I 
do below. While his account is by far the most well-worked out version 
of normative inferentialism, and hence immensely useful as a guide 
2 See Collins (2012) for a detailed and rewarding discussion of this issue. The 
contrast that Collins draws between sentence-fi rst and word-fi rst approaches (my 
terms, not his) serve, if anything, to sharpen the contrast that I’m worried about 
here. My hunch is that coming to grips with Collins’ conclusions in that work will be 
crucial to resolving the issues I raise in §4.3.
3 The picture I sketch in what follows is drawn mostly from the material in 
Brandom (1994, 2000, and 2008). In what follows, I’ll occasionally abbreviate these 
to MIE (Making it Explicit), AR (Articulating Reasons), and BSD (Between Saying 
and Doing 2008), respectively. The fi nal sections of this essay also make heavy use of 
the material in “Why Philosophy Has Failed Cognitive Science” (in Brandom 2009).
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in this area of inquiry, my intent is not so much to capture every nook 
and cranny of one particular theorist’s gargantuan philosophical sys-
tem. Rather, the goal of this section is to present and motivate an ac-
count of language that is attractive enough to warrant comparison with 
Pietroski’s independently attractive proposals about natural-language 
semantics (§2). Ultimately, it’s only by comparing them that we can put 
ourselves in a position to clearly assess the merits of either, let alone to 
contemplate their integration.
1.1. Methodology and explanatory aims
The central questions, for Brandom, are about what constitutes lan-
guage use—not by humans, necessarily, but by any natural creature 
or artifi cial system to which attributions of a linguistic competence are 
warranted. Given that normal adult humans have mastery of at least 
one natural language, Brandom’s account will, in some sense, apply 
to us as well—though perhaps only as a particular instance of a much 
more general phenomenon. Still, the inquiry he undertakes is not a 
straightforwardly psychological one; nor is it pitched as a historical or 
anthropological hypothesis. Rather, the idea is that, armed with a phil-
osophically sophisticated and conceptually articulated account of “what 
the trick is”—where “the trick” is language use, broadly construed—an 
empirical scientist (a linguist, psychologist, or artifi cial intelligence re-
searcher) can ask more detailed questions about “how the trick hap-
pens to be done” by one or another creature or artifact.
This latter kind of research is bound to yield an increasingly refi ned 
picture of some particular type of linguistic competence—paradigmati-
cally, the human type (though one often hears of impressive progress 
in interpreting the languages of other social creatures, e.g., prairie 
dogs and dolphins). Thus, although the account is intended to apply 
far beyond the human case—to aliens, robots, and other terrestrial 
animals—there is no commitment on Brandom’s part to the effect that 
empirical fi ndings can have no bearing whatsoever on his philosophi-
cal claims. Nor does he hold that legitimate empirical inquiry can take 
place only after a credible philosophical account has been supplied. 
This is just one sense in which normative inferentialism and empirical 
science, including generative linguistics, are not in competition.
One might wonder, at this point, how far removed Brandom’s proj-
ect is from empirical considerations. Perhaps too far? True, many of the 
thinkers with whom his work most directly engages did not conceive of 
their inquiries on the model of empirical theorizing. In fact, the three 
philosophers who fi gure most centrally in MIE—namely, Kant, Frege, 
and Wittgenstein—all famously made a point of distancing themselves 
from natural science. But we have to keep in mind, here as elsewhere, 
that Brandom’s theoretical framework is “a house with many rooms”. 
Thus, we need not take a one-size-fi ts-all approach to this question; 
indeed, there are good reasons not to.
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In providing detailed analyses of linguistic constructions in dis-
tinctively human languages—de dicto/re reports, truth-talk, (in)defi -
nite descriptions, indexicals, deixis, anaphora, modals, quantifi cation, 
predicates, and singular terms—Brandom relies on exactly the same 
stock of empirical considerations that one fi nds in standard semantics 
texts (e.g., Heim and Kratzer 1998). Such data are often cast in terms 
of intuitive judgments concerning the truth-values or truth-conditions 
of a target sentence, often in the context of auxiliary assumptions that 
are supplied by an accompanying vignette. But these very same data 
can equally well be recast as competent speakers’ judgements concern-
ing (not truth but) inferential proprieties—e.g., what one is required 
or permitted to infer on the basis of the assumptions supplied (in com-
bination with all prior background information that is assumed to be 
common-knowledge).4
A similar treatment can be given of metalinguistic intutions/judg-
ments concerning minimal pairs and sentential ambiguity. Two sen-
tences differ in meaning, on the inferentialist account, just in case they 
differ in respect of the inferential proprieties that govern their use. 
Likewise, a sentence is ambiguous just in case it is capable of playing 
two distinct/incompatible inferential roles. And, though he doesn’t, to 
my knowledge, ever discuss the phenomenon of polysemy, I presume 
that Brandom would treat is as a case of overlapping inferential prop-
erties—perhaps ones that meet some further normative or inferential 
conditions.
The fact that Brandom often appeals to precisely such data in de-
veloping his inferentialist semantics suggests that at least this aspect 
of his view is fi rmly grounded in empirical fact. But, as I’ll emphasize 
later, Brandom’s use of these data is not empirical but, rather, illustra-
tive. He is, in other words, using examples from English—indeed, al-
most exclusively English, in contrast with the generativist’s cross-lin-
guistic methodology—as case studies that, according to him, exemplify 
more general phenomena. Thus, the English-language examples that 
he occasionally provides—a bit too rarely, one might lament—serve not 
as empirical data for a scientifi c or naturalistic hypothesis. Rather, the 
most charitable reading of his appeals to such examples casts them as 
attempts to help us to get a conceptual grip on features of language(s) 
as such.
Still, it must be admitted that other aspects of Brandom’s overall 
picture are far less tethered to the facts on the ground. Presently, we’ll 
see that his normative pragmatics—to which his downstream propos-
als, including inferentialism, are conceptually subordinate—makes 
only very minimal empirical assumptions. For instance, it takes for 
granted that complex social creatures came into being somehow or 
other—e.g., via evolution by natural selection, or by deliberate engi-
4 My thanks to Eliot Michaelson and Daniel Harris for helping me to see the 
points in this paragraph more clearly.
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neering, as with AI. Brandom likewise presumes that the behavioral 
control systems of such creatures/artifacts—brains, motherboards, or 
what have you—work somehow or other; else they couldn’t perform 
the behaviors that institute social norms, given reasonable natural-
istic constraints. Still, putting aside such near-vacuous assumptions, 
this aspect of Brandom’s project can fairly be described as an armchair 
enterprise.5 Whether that’s something to hold against it—e.g., on the 
basis of one or another naturalist scruple—is something we can only 
ascertain only after we’ve surveyed the details of his overall proposal. 
To these we now turn.
1.2. Normative pragmatics
Brandom begins by situating all linguistic practices in the wider realm 
of activities that are, in some sense, rule-governed. The notion of a rule 
plainly stands in need of careful articulation. Given our philosophical 
history, two options immediately suggest themselves—what Brandom 
calls “regulism” and “regularism”. According to the regulist, rule-fol-
lowing is a matter of obeying rules that one can explicitly formulate or 
comprehend. By contrast, the regularist holds that rule-following is a 
matter of being disposed to behave in a way that accords with one or 
another empirical regularity. Brandom rejects both of these alterna-
tives, though, as we’ll see, his own account is an attempt to split the 
difference between them.
Regulism is vitiated, he argues, by the fact that obeying an explicit 
rule—e.g., a dictionary defi nition or an academic/prescriptive conven-
tion of grammar or style—requires fi rst interpreting the rule. This, in 
turn, requires deploying concepts—a version of precisely the phenom-
enon that we’re seeking to explain. The regularist option, he contends, 
faces a distinct challenge. A pattern of behavior—whether fi nite or in-
fi nite, actual or potential—can be either a successful or a defective case 
of following a given rule. So, with regard to any pattern of performance, 
the question always stands: has the rule in question been followed cor-
rectly? Assessments of correctness are, on Brandom’s view, inherently 
normative. Yet, what the regularist offers is a purely descriptive ac-
count, couched in the language of cognitive or behavioral dispositions 
(and perhaps other, related alethic modal notions; see §3.1).
Brandom’s positive proposal insists on the normativity of assess-
ment, characteristic of the regulist view, but jettisons the requirement 
that the rules in question be manifested explicitly from the very out-
set. Though rules of practice can eventually come to be articulated—
i.e., “made explicit”—by a community of concept-using creatures, such 
rules are, in the fi rst instance, implicit in the social practices of the 
creatures in question.
5 Notably, a former student of Brandom’s, John MacFarlane, has programmed 
a version of “the game of giving and asking for reasons” (GOGAR) for the popular 
online game, The Sims. https://www.johnmacfarlane.net/gogar.html
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Why social? Why not, instead, the practices of an individual? Put 
crudely, the reason is that isolated individuals cannot, in principle, 
serve as a normative check on their own judgment and behavior. In or-
der for a creature to be so much as subject to normative assessment, its 
behavior must take place in a context where other creatures respond 
to it in ways that signal social (dis)approval. How numerous and long-
lasting must the social relations be in order to institute a social prac-
tice, properly so called? Brandom’s answer, which will become relevant 
later in the discussion (§4.1), may be somewhat surprising. Terms like 
‘social’ and ‘communal’ bring to mind a relatively large group of crea-
tures. But, when he presses these folk terms into theoretical service, 
Brandom’s offi cial view is far less committal than that. All it really re-
quires is a dyadic “I-thou” relation—i.e., a case of mutual recognition, 
in respect of authority and responsibility, on the part of at least two 
creatures/systems. Such relations of mutual recognition can be merely 
implicit in the 2+ creatures’ overt practices toward one another—e.g., 
one or another type of social sanction.
In the most basic case, social sanctions come down to either naked 
violence or the provision of necessities—beatings and feedings. But 
once a social practice becomes suffi ciently complex, it comes to include 
not only such “external” sanctions, but also “internal” ones—e.g., ini-
tially, the granting of privileges and later the exchange of tokens of 
privilege. (We are invited here to imagine a special fruit that permits 
its bearer to enter a particular territory without being attacked by the 
creatures who guard it.) With each additional layer of interwoven in-
ternal sanctions, the community becomes increasingly ripe for institut-
ing not merely norms of practical action, broadly construed, but the 
more specifi cally linguistic norms of assertion and demand. I include 
the latter here, not because Brandom ever treats it in detail, but on 
account of his frequent invocation of the trope “the game of giving and 
asking for reasons” (my emphasis, to be sure). While the “asking” part 
seems to deserve equal attention, Brandom takes the norms governing 
assertion to be the “downtown” of language—a backhanded adaptation 
of Wittgenstein’s metaphor of language as a city with no downtown.
Having argued that assertion is the fundamental pragmatic notion, 
Brandom goes on to give an account of it in terms of the normative 
social statuses of commitment and entitlement. To illustrate these 
notions, let’s work through a hypothetical example of how the game 
of giving and asking for reasons might be played amongst a group of 
primitive hominids—or, for that matter, current prairie dogs.6
Suppose a creature produces a public token in a social context, and 
that this act has—if only in that context—the pragmatic signifi cance of 
explicitly committing the creature, in the eyes of its community, to its 
6 I am acutely aware that, despite my efforts at rendering the scenery in a 
plausibly naturalistic light, the example is not only fi ctional but transparently 
artifi cial in countless respects. I trust these won’t matter for the sake of making the 
key points accessible.
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being the case that the enemy is approaching. Each of the other crea-
tures in the group evaluates this commitment, assessing it as correct or 
incorrect on the basis of their own commitments, explicit or otherwise. 
In doing so, they take a normative stance toward the “speaker”, whom 
the group might then treat as being entitled to that commitment. The 
speaker can be entitled to a claim either by default—e.g., in cases of 
joint perception or contextually-relevant common knowledge—or by 
having undertaken prior commitments that jointly warrant the one in 
question. Initially, such normative attitudes are implicit in the asses-
sors’ overt treatment of the speaker. The group might, for instance, 
shift its attention in the direction of the speaker’s gaze upon hearing 
‘Enemy!”. If the enemy is indeed approaching in a way that is perceptu-
ally evident to the group, the entitlement is thereby secured.
Suppose now that the same speaker, now quite anxious, produces 
another token—e.g., “Run!” This counts not only as an explicit commit-
ment to a (potentially joint) plan of action, but also an implicit com-
mitment to the goodness of the inference from “Enemy!” to “Run!” And 
while the members of the group assessed the speaker as being entitled 
to the fi rst claim, they may well go on to treat this new explicit com-
mitment, i.e., “Run!”, as patently unwarranted in the circumstances. 
Again, in the most basic cases, this “treatment” or “stance” toward the 
speaker can take the form of overt actions on the part of other group 
members—e.g., grabbing hold of the speaker and keeping them in place. 
Another form of response might be the production of overt tokens that 
commit the group, including the original now-frightened speaker, to an 
incompatible plan—e.g., “Stay!” and “Fight!”. This normative incompat-
ibility is itself implicit in the overall communal practices of the group.
From these primitive beginnings, Brandom suggests, a practice can 
evolve in such a way as to allow for speakers to make explicit their com-
mitments regarding the goodness—or, in his terms, “material propri-
ety”—of the inferences that were previously only implicit in their prac-
tices. Paradigmatically, this is achieved by introducing an expression 
that has the signifi cance of a conditional. For instance, we can imagine a 
newly-evolved creature—call it v2.0—that has achieved what Brandom 
calls “semantic self-consciousness”. This involves discursively represent-
ing not just enemies and escape strategies, but also inferential relations 
between claims. Creature v2.0 can make explicit its commitment to the 
goodness of a particular inference by producing a token that has the sig-
nifi cance of the conditional, e.g., “If Enemy then Run!”7 Further elabora-
tions of v2.0’s language are manifested with the introduction of new bits 
of logical vocabulary, all of which serve to express commitments regard-
ing various inferential relations. For instance, negation expresses the 
relation of inferential incompatibility between claims (see below). This is 
the core thesis of what Brandom calls “logical expressivism”.
7 Note that the force operator, ‘!’, is stripped off from the atomic propositions, 
“Enemy!” and “Run!”, when the latter are embedded in a conditional. This point 
comes to the foreground in §4.2.
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Turning to more complex logico-semantic devices, consider the 
phenomenon of indirect discourse. Brandom proposes that de dicto re-
ports of “what was said” are used to make explicit the attribution of 
commitments to oneself or to others. For instance, my asserting “Dan 
said that p” makes explicit my commitment to Dan’s having explic-
itly undertaken his own commitment to the effect that p. In a similar 
fashion, epistemic vocabulary can play the role of making explicit a 
speaker’s assessment of someone’s entitlement to the commitments that 
they’ve undertaken. For instance, were I to upgrade my assertion to 
“Dan knows that p,” I would not only be attributing the commitment to 
Dan, but also committing myself to it, and explicitly representing him 
as being entitled to it. Brandom (2001: ch. 4) points out that these three 
pragmatic aspects of knowledge attributions—entitlement-attribution, 
commitment-undertaking, and commitment-attribution—correspond, 
in that order, to the three elements of the traditional Justifi ed-True-
Belief account of knowledge.
What about deontic modal terms? Brandom argues that these serve 
to make explicit one’s commitment to a plan of action. In saying “I 
ought to ”, I make explicit my commitment to a plan to . Similarly, 
terms like ‘must’ can be used to make explicit an inferential propri-
ety that is insensitive to changes in auxiliary assumptions, up to some 
boundary condition—e.g., natural or legislated laws. Thus, assertions 
like “In order to light the wick safely, one must fi rst clean one’s hands” 
serve to make explicit a speaker’s commitment to the material propri-
ety of the inference from “The wick-lighting is safe” to “Your hands 
are clean,” irrespective of what commitments they have concerning a 
wide range of possible auxiliary assumptions, such as “It’s raining else-
where,” “I never met my grandfather,” and “Child-traffi cking is a seri-
ous problem.” Whether or not these latter are included in one’s set of 
commitments, the inference from “The wick-lighting is safe” to “Your 
hands are clean” is ostensibly good. Of course, auxiliary commitments 
that confl ict with one’s views on natural laws—e.g., “Gasoline burns 
when lit”—would render the inference materially invalid. That’s what 
talk of “boundary conditions” is intended to capture. In the case of the 
purely nomic reading of ‘must’, as in “Oxygen must be present for com-
bustion,” the inference from “Combustion is occurring” to “Oxygen was 
present” is good under substitution of virtually any commitment, other 
than those regarding physical or chemical law.
In this vein, Brandom provides rich pragmatic analyses of a variety 
of other “vocabularies”, including the (meta)semantic devices ‘repre-
sents’ and ‘is about’, as well as indexicals, alethic modals, anaphoric 
pronouns, and de re attitude reports. Some of the details of these analy-
ses will emerge throughout the present discussion, and I’ll devote spe-
cial attention to his account of de re constructions in §3.4. For the mo-
ment, the case that’s most important to examine is that of ‘true’, as this 
bears directly on Brandom’s rejection of truth-conditional semantics—
arguably the main negative contention that he shares with Pietroski. 
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Brandom offers a clear and well-motivated alternative to the standard 
treatment of truth in terms of “correspondence”—a notoriously vexed 
notion that lay at the heart of truth-conditional semantics. Instead he 
develops a refi ned version of the “defl ationary” approach of truth and 
reference—arguably the best on the market, as we’ll see presently.
1.3. Defl ationism about truth and reference
In asserting that things are thus-and-so, a speaker takes on the prag-
matic normative status of a discursive commitment. What is it, then, 
for another person to say that the fi rst speaker’s assertion is true? The 
normative pragmatic answer is this: in asserting that some claim is 
true, one not only ascribes a commitment to the speaker who made it, 
but one also undertakes that commitment oneself.8 This allows for the 
possibility—enormously useful in social practice—for a speaker to take 
on commitments that they cannot at present articulate. The inability 
may be either to memory loss (“I don’t remember exactly what she said, 
but it was defi nitely true”) or to time constraints (“She gave a long 
speech; I’m not going to repeat the whole thing now, but everything she 
said was obviously true”). In the most interesting cases, complete ar-
ticulation is impossible within physical limits, the set of commitments 
being literally infi nite, as with “The theorems of Peano arithmetic are 
all true”.
Thus, on Brandom’s view, the term ‘true’ and its cognates (‘truth’, 
‘correctness’, etc.) all serve a distinctive expressive function, without 
which branches of discourse such as mathematics would be impos-
sible. Specifi cally, these terms all serve to express a commitment to 
something already asserted (or, at any rate, assertible). Brandom thus 
labels this an “expressivist” account of truth, of a piece with his more 
general expressivist approach to logical vocabulary. The semantics for 
truth ascriptions is elaborated still further in light of his discussion 
of anaphora (§1.7). The notion of inter-sentential (and inter-speaker) 
anaphora will allow us to appreciate how truth ascriptions can have 
the pragmatic function of allowing the inheritance of commitments and 
entitlements across inter-personal exchanges.
If this pragmatic expressivist account of our use of ‘true’ (and re-
lated terms) is correct, then there is no obvious reason why anything 
further needs to be said about truth. The latter is often conceived of as a 
metaphysical language-world relation—the very one denoted/satisfi ed 
by the term ‘truth’ and its cognates. But there seems to be no explana-
tory work for which such a relation is obviously indispensable—nei-
ther in semantics nor, Brandom argues, in any other area of theorizing. 
This puts his view in the same camp as other versions of “defl ation-
ism” about truth—particularly, the well-known disquotational (Quine 
8 In the special case where the speaker and the assessor are identical—as in, 
“What I’m saying is true!”—the commitment is both redundant and guaranteed, 
though the term is still useful, in such cases, if only for emphasis and the like.
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1970), minimalist (Horwich 1990), and prosentential accounts (Grover, 
Camp, and Belnap 1975). I take all of these to share the following core 
commitments:
(i)  a rejection of any account/analysis of truth in terms of corre-
spondence, coherence, or warranted assertibility, on the grounds 
that truth is not a relation (of any kind)
(ii) the aim of casting the notion of meaning as explanatorily prior to 
that of truth, both in semantics and elsewhere (including meta-
physics, epistemology, and ethics)
The differences between disquotationalism, minimalism, and prosen-
tentialism have mostly to do with matters of detail, such as whether to 
ascribe truth to sentences or to propositions, or how exactly to interpret 
Tarski biconditionals, liar sentences, and quantifi ed truth ascriptions. 
These disputes are all strictly irrelevant for our purposes. What’s im-
portant here is that Brandom’s version of defl ationism is designed to 
claim the virtues of each of these prior accounts, without succumbing to 
the technical objections that have been lodged against them. The three 
main improvements he suggests are (i) subordinating the semantics 
of truth ascriptions to his brand of normative pragmatics, (ii) paying 
closer attention to the syntax of truth ascriptions, especially their inter-
sentential anaphoric structure (§1.7), and (iii) extending the defl ation-
ist account to other semantic notions, including reference, satisfaction, 
and de re representation. While (i) is a straightforward application of 
Brandom’s broader strategy, and (ii) serves largely to immunize his 
version of defl ationism from extant objections, (iii) strikes me as a 
genuine extension of Brandom’s normative pragmatics, allowing it to 
handle both sentential and subsentential expressions.
The notions of truth and reference are plainly central to the project 
of truth-conditional semantics. Thus, many have noted that a defl a-
tionist account of these notions requires a radical re-thinking of what 
shape a formal semantic theory should take. In this regard, we now 
have an embarrassment of riches. In addition to old-school proposals 
about warranted assertibility, and the pragmatists’ short-lived “suc-
cess semantics” (see Brandom 2009 for critique), we now have the ben-
efi t of more modern proposals, including both Pietroski’s cognitivist 
account (§2) and Brandom’s inferentialism. Let’s examine the latter.
1.4. Inferentialist semantics
Having situated assertional practices within the broader sphere of 
rule-governed social activity, Brandom has introduced his key prag-
matic notions of commitment and entitlement. He goes on to show how 
these normative statuses, taken together, can be used to construct a 
semantic theory, whose business it is to explain (in some sense) how 
linguistic expressions can come to play the roles that they do in a com-
munity’s assertional practices.
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In familiar fashion, the explanation goes by way of assigning “mean-
ings” or “semantic values” to expression types. But, in keeping with 
his other commitments, Brandom does not equate meanings with truth 
conditions, sets of possible worlds, pragmatic success conditions, or as-
sertibility criteria. Rather, he subordinates his semantic theory to the 
normative pragmatics just outlined, by treating meanings as the infer-
ential proprieties that govern the use of linguistic expressions. Slurring 
over a considerable mass of detail, we can summarize the proposal as 
follows: 
Inferentialism: For a given propositional expression, ‘P’, the meaning 
of ‘P’ can be modeled as the set of sets of other propositional 
expressions that 
(i) entitle one to ‘P’ in the presence of (various sets of) auxiliary 
commitments,
(ii) commit one to ‘P’ in the presence of (various sets of) auxiliary 
commitments, as well as those to which
(iii) ‘P’ commits one in the presence of (various sets of) auxiliary com-
mitments, and
(iv) ‘P’ entitles one in the presence of (various sets of) auxiliary com-
mitments.
A particularly useful compound inferential relation turns out to be 
that of incompatibility, wherein taking on one commitment precludes 
a speaker from becoming entitled to another. In this sense, a commit-
ment to “Herbie is a dog” is incompatible with entitlement to “Herbie is 
a bird”. Brandom (2008: ch. 5) shows how to build a modal propositional 
semantics on the basis of just this incompatibility relation, treating the 
negation of a claim, for instance, as the minimal set of commitments 
that are incompatible with it. Here again, the details are illuminating, 
but only one signifi cant upshot bears highlighting for present purposes.
Casting the meaning of an expression in terms of its inferential 
proprieties vis-à-vis other expressions plainly commits one to meaning 
holism. A common charge against theories of a holist stripe is that they 
founder on the rock of compositionality. For instance, Fodor and Lepore 
(1992) famously argue that inferential roles don’t compose, whereas 
meanings do; a fortiori, meanings can’t be inferential roles. But the 
formal incompatibility semantics developed by Brandom (2008) pro-
vides a direct counterexample the main premise of this argument, by 
demonstrating how a inferentialist semantics can in fact provably meet 
reasonable compositionality constraints, at least in the modal proposi-
tional case.9 In any event, we will see that there are other reasons to 
reject Fodor and Lepore’s arguments.
9 Although, as of this writing, an analogous proof for the quantifi cational case 
remains elusive, I am aware of no principled reasons for thinking that such a proof 
won’t emerge—if not tomorrow, then someday. As will become clear throughout, I 
adopt a resolutely optimistic attitude toward such matters.
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1.5. Substitutional “syntax”
We’ve now put on the table both a normative pragmatics and an infer-
entialist semantics. However, it’s relatively uncontroversial that only 
proposition-sized expressions can enter directly into inferential rela-
tions as premises and conclusions.10 That being so, we still need to say 
how subsentential bits of language can have meanings of their own. 
Identifying subsentential expressions will allow us to explain how such 
expressions can go on to contribute to the indefi nitely many assertions 
that a creature like us can interpret and produce. While there is no 
conceptual barrier, on Brandom’s picture, to a community of creatures/
robots using a language with only fi nitely many complex expressions, 
our own case plainly illustrates that languages can and do come in 
varieties that admit of productive generation. So, while a fi rst-pass pre-
sentation of the inferentialist approach is best conducted in terms of 
a community of creatures that uses a fi nite language—such as might 
easily be found in (extra)terrestrial nature or constructed in a robotics 
laboratory (e.g., AIBO dogs)—it does not follow, and is not true, that 
the inferentialist program abdicates the responsibility of explaining 
the productive nature of some languages. Quite the contrary; Brandom 
takes his account of subsentential meanings to constitute one of the 
core achievements of the inferentialist program.
The primary notion of an inferentialist semantics for subsentential 
expressions is that of substitution, which Brandom inherits from (a re-
constructed time-slice of) Frege. Starting with a fi nite stock of sentence 
types, , each of whose free-standing (i.e., unembedded) uses have the 
default pragmatic signifi cance of performing an assertion, we can ask 
whether any members of  can be treated as substitutional variants of 
any others. Keeping to the level of naïve intuition, the sentence ‘David 
admires Herbie’ is a substitutional variant of ‘Jessica admires Herbie’. 
We’ll see more about how this works in a moment, but the key take-
away point is this: if a sentence has a set of substitutional variants, 
then we can, to that extent, discern its subsentential structure. That 
is, by relating one sentence to another inferentially via substitution, 
we can notice and distinguish re-combinable subsentential expressions 
within the sentences of the language. Let’s work through an example.
Take the sentence ‘David admires Herbie’ and chop it up any way 
you like, in respect of phonology, orthography, or whatever surface-
level features happen to be relevant to the language at hand.11 One 
way of doing so will yield ‘Herbie’ as a proper part; another yields ‘… 
10 For a dissenting view, see Stainton (2006).
11 We’ll do things in terms of orthography here (given the medium), but 
phonology is plainly the more primitive of the two in the human case, both phylo- 
and ontogenetically, as textbooks in empirical linguistics have long emphasized. For 
future robots, the medium will likely be something else—perhaps some descendent 
of TCP/IP. This would require adapting the substitutional techniques to that 
particular case.
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…‘erbi’...’. Now do the same with every other member of , where the 
latter is assumed to be fi nite.12 This yields a set of subsentential bits, 
, consisting largely of nonsense like …‘dmire’… and …‘vid admi’…. 
With this in hand, go back to ‘David admires Herbie’ and substitute 
any other member of  (or, for that matter, ) in place of ‘Herbie’. You’ll 
fi nd that most such substitutions yield uninterpretable gibberish—i.e., 
expressions that can enter into no inferential relations with the ante-
cedently interpreted members of . For instance, substituting ‘jump’ 
for ‘Herbie’ yields ‘David admires jump’, which has no inferential con-
sequences. Same for ‘jumps rapidly’, ‘red’, ‘we’, and …‘rential cons’…. 
By contrast, a commitment to ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously’ 
would presumably preclude entitlement to ‘Nothing ever sleeps furi-
ously’, ‘There are no colorless green things’, ‘Ideas can only be red’, and 
many other propositions. There is a clear sense, then, in which this 
famous sentence is perfectly well interpretable. (It’s even false!)
Setting aside gibberish, there will be a subclass of expressions that, 
when substituted for ‘Herbie’ in ‘David admires Herbie’, yield interpre-
table sentences, such as ‘David admires Jessica’, ‘Jessica admires Her-
bie’, ‘David feeds Herbie’, and ‘David feeds Jessica’. (Again, a sentence 
is interpretable just in case it can play the role of premise or conclusion 
in an inference.) This subclass of , call it , contains all and only the 
recombinable elements—i.e., the subsentential units of the language—
including words, phrases, clauses, morphemes, subjects, predicates, or 
whatever other syntactic categories the language in question contains. 
We can now call one sentence, S, a substitutional variant of another, 
S*, just in case S is the result of substituting one element of  with 
another in any member of . Thus, ‘David admires Herbie’ is a substi-
tutional variant of ‘Jessica admires Herbie’, on account of its being the 
result of the substitution of ‘David’ for ‘Jessica’.
The foregoing puts us in a position to entertain a new inferential 
relation between sentences. Let’s call an inference substitutional just 
in case the conclusion is a substitutional variant of one of the premises. 
The two inferences, from ‘David admires Herbie’ to either ‘David feeds 
Herbie’ or to ‘David admires Jessica’, are both fi ne examples. This no-
12 Any actual creature’s primary linguistic data (PLD) will, of necessity, be fi nite 
for in the course of language acquisition. The obvious analogy to the case of language 
acquisition in human children should not tempt us into assuming that Brandom is 
pitching an empirical account of the stages of acquisition. Still, the analogy is worth 
noting, even if we strongly suspect—as generativists do, pace Tomasello (2005)—
that children’s linguistic capacities are productive/generative right from the get-go. 
From the latter hypothesis, it follows that there is no such thing, really, as a fi nite 
set of PLD for the child, the child’s acquisition device is always doing something 
analogous to hypothesis testing, even in the absence of input data. On this picture, 
the set of PLD is a constantly-moving target—in effect, a massively complex mental 
representation, or representational structure/system, within the child. The latter is 
plainly not identical with the set of utterances that happened to be produced in a 
child’s presence.
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tion of a substitutional inference is what allows for an application of 
the inferentialist strategy to subsentential expressions.
Subsentential Meaning: The meaning of a subsentential expression, 
 , is the set of materially good substitution 
 inferences involving .
Thus, the meaning of ‘Herbie’ is the set of inferential proprieties that 
includes {‘David feeds Herbie’  ‘David feeds Herb’}, {‘David feeds Her-
bie’  ‘David feeds a dog}, and {‘David feeds Herbie’  ‘David feeds his 
dog’}, and many others.13 In all such cases, the substitutional inferences 
are materially good in virtue of the fact that ‘Herbie’ is substituted by 
any of his other actual names, or by other ways of correctly describing 
him, uniquely or otherwise.
Needless to say, no one—not I, and certainly not Herbie—will ever 
have a full grasp of the set of inferential proprieties that governs the 
use of the expression ‘Herbie’, as this would involve knowing every-
thing there is to know about him. Nor is there any guarantee that any 
two speakers will converge from the outset on what is correct to infer 
from “David feeds Herbie”—e.g., whether inferring “David feeds a dog” 
is (materially) good. Rather, the point is this: given that there are, in 
point of fact, plenty of ways for me to entitle myself to “Herbie is a 
dog”, and no plausible ways (please grant) to undercut that entitle-
ment, it would be incorrect, pragmatically improper, and epistemically 
unwarranted for someone to assert the opposite. This holds even if my 
interlocutor is strongly disposed to maintain a contrary position on 
the matter (foolishly, no doubt). It’s important to always keep in mind 
that normative inferentialism is not about inferential propensities; it’s 
about inferential proprieties.
1.6. Predicates and singular terms
One consequence of the view presented thus far is that some linguistic 
expressions can be inferentially stronger or weaker than others. Con-
sider the verbs ‘runs’ and ‘moves’. The latter is logically stronger than 
the former because all substitution inferences from ‘x runs’ to ‘x moves’ 
are good, but the reverse inferences generally aren’t. In such cases, the 
substitution inferences are said to be asymmetric. We also fi nd terms 
that invariably enter into symmetric substitution inferences—e.g., 
from ‘Mark Twain was an American’ to ‘Samuel Clemens was an Amer-
ican’ and back again. To make the latter type of inference explicit, sub-
sentential expressions of identity and nonidentity can be introduced, 
yielding propositions of the form = and ≠ (e.g., ‘Sam Clemens is 
identical with Mark Twain’ and ‘David is not Herbie’).14
13 For simplicity of presentation, I suppress issues to do with possessives like ‘my’ 
and ‘his’, and indexical expressions more generally. Brandom (1994, 2008) supplies 
an account of these, but the details are irrelevant here.
14 The notion of “introduction” that I intend here is the one developed in 
Brandom (2008). Roughly, a community is capable of introducing a novel expression, 
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As we will see in §4, Brandom holds that the distinction between 
predicates and singular terms comes down to the distinction between 
those expressions that must license only symmetric inferences (e.g., 
‘Herbie’ and ‘the dog’), and those that merely can license symmetric 
inferences, but need not do so (e.g., ‘deer-like’, ‘jumps’, and ‘rapidly). 
On the basis of this claim, Brandom goes on to develop a complex line 
of reasoning whose ultimate conclusion I’ll call the “asymmetry con-
straint”.
Asymmetry Constraint: Any language that draws no distinction 
 between predicates and singular terms 
 (conceived in the above manner) is in 
 principle precluded from introducing condi-
 tionals—i.e., expressions that make explicit 
 one’s commitment to the goodness of
 an inference—and other basic operators of 
 propositional logic.
This claim will come to the foreground when we contrast it with Pi-
etroski’s predicativism, according to which there are in fact no singular 
terms at all in natural languages. If Brandom’s argument succeeds, 
then Pietroski’s predicativist semantic theory faces a serious challenge. 
Contrapositively, if Pietroski’s predicativism is correct, then there 
must be a fl aw in Brandom’s reasoning. This is, in fact, the fi nal puzzle 
for the overall reconciliation project that I’ll be urging here.
1.7. Types, tokens, and anaphoric chains
The expressions discussed thus far have all been linguistic types, to-
kens of which may well diverge in meaning from their primary signifi -
cance in the language. Indeed, terms like ‘Herbie’ have so many differ-
ent uses—one for my dog, another for the pianist, Herbie Hancock, and 
countless others—that Brandom needs an account of what makes any 
use of ‘Herbie’ semantically co-typical with any other. The question ap-
plies even to intra-sentential occurrences: What makes it the case, for 
instance, that both tokens of ‘Herbie’ in ‘Herbie admires Herbie’ of the 
same type in a given communicative context?
In providing his answer, Brandom introduces the last of the major 
technical notions that he needs in order to carry off his overall project—
viz., the notion of anaphora. Linguists and philosophers have paid a 
great deal of attention to intra-sentential anaphora, as in ‘If a man is a 
in this sense, just in case its members already have the practical abilities that are 
necessary and suffi cient for being able to express—i.e., to make explicit—normative 
attitudes that were previously only implicit in their practice. Thus, the practical 
ability to implicitly treat someone as having entitled themselves to q by committing 
themselves to p is both necessary and suffi cient to introduce conditional expressions 
that make explicit the material goodness of that inference—e.g., ‘p  q’ and ‘If p then 
q’. We will see in §2.5 that Pietroski’s notion of concept introduction is different from 
Brandom’s, and arguably orthogonal.
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police offi cer, then he was born out of wedlock’, where the pronoun ‘he’ 
is anaphoric on ‘a man’. Syntacticians, in particular, have devised prin-
ciples of generative grammar that aim to explain the natural distri-
bution of anaphoric expressions within sentences of natural language. 
Somewhat less effort has thus far been expended on analyzing inter-
sentential anaphora, as in the following exchange between speakers 
Mihir and Rushal.
 Mihir: That man seems to have fallen ill right after he ap-
proached the police line.
 Rushal: He must have gotten hit by their fancy new sonic weap-
on.
 Mihir: Oh, hey, I didn’t see you there! Do you happen to know 
the guy?
 Rushal: No, I just heard you talking about him and I fi gured I’d 
chime in.
Here, an anaphoric chain is initiated by Mihir’s use of ‘That man’, 
which is then picked up by ‘he’ later in the same sentence. But the 
chain doesn’t end there. Rushal’s use of ‘He’ is anaphoric on Mihir’s 
use of ‘That man’ and ‘he’. Mihir’s response picks up the anaphoric 
chain with an occurrence of ‘the guy’, which then continues onward to 
Rushal’s use of ‘him’, and to occurrences of other expressions in subse-
quent discourse. Setting aside syntactic issues, what can we say about 
this phenomenon at the level of meaning?
In keeping with his inferentialist semantics, Brandom argues that 
an anaphoric chain is one in which the inferential proprieties govern-
ing the anaphoric initiator (e.g., Mihir’s use of ‘That man’) are inherited 
by subsequent expressions in the chain. Thus, if Mihir’s use of ‘That 
man’ is partly governed by his commitment to ‘That man is falling ill 
on live television’, then Rushal inherits this commitment (among oth-
ers) in picking up the anaphoric chain with the use of ‘He’, along with 
whatever entitlements for this claim Mihir had already secured prior 
to Rushal’s appearance on the scene.
With this account in hand, Brandom treats as a special case oc-
currences that are treated as semantically co-typical because they 
are phonologically or orthographically co-typical—e.g., the two occur-
rences of ‘Herbie’ in ‘Herbie admires Herbie’. From this perspective, 
all expression types consist of long-stretching anaphoric chains of in-
dividual use—an idea familiar from causal theories of reference-bor-
rowing, though shorn of various optional commitments. This account 
also makes it clear what’s happening at the level of pragmatics. In 
picking up anaphoric chains, speakers are able to take on normative 
statuses—paradigmatically, commitments and entitlements—without 
themselves having explicitly avowed those statuses, and often without 
having much (if any) idea what exactly it is that they’ve inherited. To 
illustrate, we can extend the above example.
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Suppose Rushal had no prior commitments regarding the victim’s 
appearance on television, or indeed anything at all about the victim, but 
was strongly committed to the claim that police don’t use sonic weapons 
on camera. In that case, upon being subsequently apprised of Mihir’s 
entitlement to ‘That man is falling ill on live television’, Rushal will be 
under normative pressure to either revise his prior commitments about 
on-camera police violence, or to withdraw the claim that the victim must 
have been affected by a specifi cally sonic weapon. In this second case, 
the revision can target either the predicate ‘sonic’—perhaps the police 
used an invisible gas—or the alethic modal expression ,‘must’. The lat-
ter, on Brandom’s view, functions to make explicit the modal robustness 
of an inference—i.e., its insensitivity to substitutions of background 
auxiliary commitments, up to some boundary conditions (e.g., physical 
law). In the present case, the boundary conditions are set by Rushal’s 
commitments regarding the general institutional practices of local po-
lice. In order to regain epistemic equilibrium, Rushal can revise various 
commitments concerning these practices; for instance, he might con-
clude that the local Sheriff has deemed this to be a special occasion, on 
which on-camera use of sonic weapons is warranted.
1.8. Summary
We’ve now surveyed the main contours of Brandom’s overall philosoph-
ical project. The explanatory strategy he pursues can be characterized 
as “top-down”, in the sense that he begins by offering an account of com-
munal normative practices, in the broadest sense, and identifi es within 
these an important subclass—namely, practices that serve to institute 
distinctively linguistic norms governing assertion and other commu-
nicative acts. (One last plea for demands!) Such norms pertain to the 
inferential proprieties that expression types have in their semantically 
primary occurrences. Thus, the account moves “down” a step—from a 
normative pragmatics that posits statuses of commitment and entitle-
ment, to an inferentialist semantics that aims to analyze meaning in 
terms of these statuses. The meaning of a propositional expression type 
is, on this picture, identifi ed with its normative inferential role—i.e., 
what other claims it commits or entitles one to, and what commitments 
one must undertake in order secure an entitlement to it.
Drilling down still further, Brandom develops the substitutional 
approach, which allows one to “dissect” proposition-sized expression 
types, revealing subsentential bits of vocabulary. These carry their 
own “ingredient content”, despite lacking the free-standing signifi cance 
of propositional expressions that enter directly into inferences as prem-
ises or conclusions. The details of this proposal put in place the theo-
retical commitments that Brandom needs in order to distinguish predi-
cates from singular terms—a distinction that he goes on to argue will 
be discernable in any linguistic practice that allows for the introduction 
of conditionals and other logical operators (§4.3).
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Having offered a treatment of propositional and subsentential ex-
pression types, Brandom steps down another rung on the explanato-
ry ladder, developing a conception of anaphora that applies far more 
broadly than standard discussions in the literature might lead one 
to suspect. The anaphoric relationship is, on this view, one of infer-
ential inheritance, wherein the proprieties governing the use of one 
expression—the initiator of an anaphoric chain—are taken to then 
also govern the expressions occurring later in the chain, irrespective 
of the speaker’s acknowledgement (or even awareness) of the statuses 
they’ve thereby undertaken. The latter condition serves to explain how 
speakers can felicitously use expressions whose total set of inferential 
proprieties is unknown to them, and perhaps even to anyone in the 
community.
One might think that all of this is utterly wrongheaded right from 
the get-go—the normativity, the substitutions, and even the top-level 
goal of delineating language-use as such. Indeed, from the perspective 
of a mainstream contemporary linguist or philosopher of language, 
Brandom’s whole “top-down” explanatory strategy will seem downright 
perverse. The more common bottom-up alternative goes as follows.
Taking for granted the notions of denotation/reference and satisfac-
tion, as applied to subsentential expressions, the bottom-up theorist 
seeks to formalize a compositional apparatus for building propositions 
out of them. Free-standing propositional complexes are thereby recur-
sively assigned their own special kind of semantic value: e.g., possible-
worlds truth conditions (Heim and Kratzer 1998) or sets of possible 
worlds (Stalnaker 1984). This, in turn, opens the door to a theory of 
linguistic communication, according to which speakers append illocu-
tionary forces to the range of recursively-specifi ed meanings, yielding a 
variety of speech-act types (questions, commands, etc.). The inferences 
in which a (now-interpreted) speech act type fi gures can then be clas-
sifi ed as good or bad in virtue of the semantic structures that the com-
binatorial apparatus assigns to their premises and conclusions, as well 
as the illocutionary forces that (somehow) “attach” to those structures. 
Having thus analyzed the semantic properties of speech acts and in-
ferences, one might note that some—perhaps, in the end, all—of these 
have features that reliably trigger unencapsulated pragmatic reason-
ing. This motivates the familiar project of supplementing a pragmatic 
theory with “maxims” of rational cooperative communication/action 
(Grice 1989; Sperber and Wilson, 1986). Theorists who have carried out 
this latter project have developed impressive accounts of implicature, 
metaphor, and other complex communicative phenomena (Levinson 
1983; Harris 2020).
Proponents of the bottom-up strategy have pressed a catalogue of 
objections to Brandom’s project. These include, but are not limited to, 
the following: (i) insistence on a compositionality constraint that the 
inferentialist allegedly can’t accommodate; (ii) rejection of the idea that 
language is fundamentally a communicative system; (iii) requirement 
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that any legitimate inquiry foreswear traffi cking in normative assess-
ments; and (iv) an allegation to the effect that normative inferentialism 
is incompatible with what is known empirically about the human mind/
brain, particularly in respect of its language-processing abilities.
Before any of these challenges can be met, each stands in need of 
careful articulation. As previously noted, I believe that such a task is 
best undertaken by pitting Brandom’s project against what appears, 
at fi rst blush, to be a rival alternative. (As advertised, I’ll argue after-
wards that the appearances are often deceiving in this regard.) With 
that in mind, I now turn to the work of Paul Pietroski, whose semantic 
theory is a recent and powerful contribution to the larger enterprise of 
generative linguistics.
2. Pietroski: Meanings as pronounceable instructions 
for concept assembly
The theoretical commitments that comprise Paul Pietroski’s approach 
to natural-language semantics are advanced and defended in his recent 
book, Conjoining Meanings (henceforth CM).15 In this section, I sum-
marize several of Pietroski’s main contributions, highlighting aspects 
of his view that bear on my ecumenical strategy in §§3-4. To be clear 
from the outset, the ideas laid out in CM strike me as constituting 
genuine progress in our understanding of the psychological mecha-
nisms of human language use. Moreover, I fi nd wholly compelling his 
arguments against the central pillars of received views in semantics—
particularly, the commitment to an extensional/truth-conditional ap-
proach. The book, overall, is replete with rich and instructive discus-
sions of topics that go well beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
But while we won’t be able to look at the details of some of Pietroski’s 
original proposals here, it’s worth noting that they are all, to my mind, 
persuasively motivated by historical, formal, and empirical consider-
ations. That having been said, let’s dive in.
2.1. A different methodology and new explanatory aims 
While Brandom’s inferentialist approach is virtually unknown in cog-
nitive science, the methodology of generative linguistics will be famil-
iar to many in the fi eld, at least in broad outline. Rooted in a founda-
tional commitment to naturalistic inquiry, the idea is to treat language 
as a biological phenomenon—not necessarily in the sense that it has 
an adaptive function (Chomsky [2016] disputes this), but in the sense 
that a neurophysiologically realized cognitive structure is the explicit 
target of inquiry. The linguist thus works on the assumption that hu-
man minds contain a language-specifi c device—a “faculty”, “module”, 
or “mental organ”—with a distinctive computational architecture, a 
15 This section elaborates the material in Pereplyotchik (2019). The operative 
notion of a subpersonal level of description is spelled out in Pereplyotchik (2017: ch. 7).
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proprietary representational format, and dedicated/domain-specifi c 
information-processing routines. The goal is to provide a detailed speci-
fi cation of each of these, yielding a neurocognitive account of the acqui-
sition and use of language.
On analogy with bodily organs, the faculty of language (henceforth 
FL) is assumed to “grow” within the child during the early years of 
development. This happens in accordance with a genetic program, phe-
notypically realized in the child’s innate ability to acquire linguistic 
competence under a diverse range of social and environmental circum-
stances. Thus, a central aim of generative linguistics is to specify not 
only the grammar of an adult language, but also the principles that un-
derlie language acquisition—particularly those that allow the child to 
home in on a specifi c grammar in a relatively short time, with little or 
no (overt) negative evidence (Chomsky 1986; Yang 2006). This problem 
is made exceedingly challenging by the fact that natural languages are 
invariably productive/generative, meaning that they allow for bound-
less applications of combinatorial recursive operations, yielding a dis-
crete infi nity of nonredundant16 interpretable structures.
The generativist’s strategy for dealing with this central feature of 
natural language is to posit grammatical principles that are inherently 
compositional at all levels of analysis—phonology, morphology, syntax, 
and semantics. The syntactic module of FL is taken to merge the ele-
ments of the lexicon—atomic units of a language that contribute their 
distinctive meanings to more complex structures. On the basis of these, 
the semantic module recursively generates complex meanings, which 
can enter into downstream personal-level cognition—judgment, rea-
soning, planning, and the like.17
Pietroski’s main goal in CM is to characterize the semantic module 
by offering a detailed proposal about its proprietary representational 
format—specifi cally, the nature of the lexical items—and the computa-
tional operations that assemble larger interpretable structures. At the 
level of format, the hypothesis he develops is that virtually all lexical 
items are predicates, the latter being restricted to only two types—mo-
nadic and (semi)dyadic. Regarding computational operations, Pietroski 
aims to make do with a bare minimum of compositional semantic prin-
ciples, with the lion’s share of work being done by nothing more than 
two fl avors of predicate conjunction (one for each type of predicate). 
16 Pietroski points out that this goes well beyond mere recursion, which is 
trivially satisfi ed by any languages with a rule for applying sentential operators. 
The infi nitude of English thus differs qualitatively from the infi nitude of a language 
that permits the formation only of P, P&P, P&(P&P),… or P, ~P, ~~P, ~~~P,….
17 It’s important to note that what has been said thus far is not (yet) intended 
as a theory of real-time/on-line language processing. Rather, it is to be seen as an 
abstract characterization of the architecture and internal operations of a specifi c 
cognitive structure, acquired at birth and persisting in a stable state thereafter 
(Chomsky 1995).
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We’ll look at some of the details shortly, maintaining our present focus 
on matters of methodology.
Following Chomsky (1986, 1995, 2000), Pietroski adopts an indi-
vidualist position, taking the object of study to be an “I-language”—an 
intensionally-specifi ed procedure internal to an individual language 
user. He supports this with forceful arguments against the alternative 
conception of language(s) that we fi nd in the work of David Lewis (1969, 
1970, 1973). A language, on this rival picture, is a kind of abstract ob-
ject—namely, an extensionally-specifi ed a set of well-formed sentenc-
es—which is “selected” by a population of creatures, via the adoption 
of social/communicative “conventions”. The latter Lewis sees as jointly 
constituting a public language, such as English or Norwegian—what 
generativists refer to as “E-languages”. Pietroski rejects virtually every 
aspect of this picture. We’ll look at his reasons for doing so in §4. For 
now, it’s suffi cient to distinguish three key points of contention.
First, there’s the metaphysics. Lewis (1973) says languages are 
abstracta, whereas Pietroski sees them as biologically-instantiated 
computational procedures. Then there’s the issue of extensionality. Pi-
etroski rejects Lewis’s theoretical goals, which consist merely of exten-
sionally specifying meaning-pronunciation pairs, and adopts instead 
a more weighty explanatory aim—namely, that of specifying human 
linguistic competence as a function-in-intension. Only in this way, he 
argues, can the resulting theory capture the psychologically real opera-
tions that yield interpretable structures. Finally, there’s the issue of 
publicity, and related troubles with Lewis’s notion of “selection”. Pi-
etroski’s individualist stance leads him to eschew the folk-ontological 
commitment to public languages, at least for the purposes of mature 
empirical inquiry. This manifests in his methodological practice of fo-
cusing on matters of individual psychology—e.g., internal mechanisms 
of semantic composition—rather than the social practices of linguistic 
communication. Accordingly, Pietroski sees Lewis’s appeal to public 
conventions as generally unhelpful for—indeed, an outright distrac-
tion from—the empirical study of linguistic meaning.
Pietroski’s disagreements with Lewis go well beyond such method-
ological issues, extending to matters of technical detail. For, in addi-
tion to the large-scale commitments mentioned thus far, Lewis (1970) 
also developed a powerful formal apparatus for conducting semantic 
theorizing. Expressions, in this scheme, are assigned “semantic types”, 
which are either basic or recursively derived. The interpretation of 
complex structures is then accomplished by functions that map one se-
mantic type onto another. In its most familiar version, such a semantic 
theory will assign sentences the basic type <t> and singular terms the 
basic type <e>. Thereafter, monadic predicates can be treated as hav-
ing the derived type <<e>, <t>>, which is a function from things of type 
<e> to things of type <t>.
Although this formal typology presupposes no particular metaphys-
ics or metasemantics, it’s common in practice to think of singular terms 
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as denoting entities (e.g., Jessica), and sentences as denoting truth-
values (T and F). With this in place, monadic predicates like ‘swims’ 
can be assigned the semantic function of mapping the entities in its 
domain to the truth-values in its range. For instance, ‘Jessica swims’ 
is mapped to T just in case Jessica (the actual person) satisfi es the 
predicate ‘swims’; otherwise, F. Likewise, adverbs such as ‘often’ and 
‘expertly’ have the derived type <<<e>, <t>>, <t>>, which is a function 
that maps the semantic value of predicates (i.e., functions from <e> to 
<t>) to the semantic values of sentences (i.e., T or F). Put somewhat im-
precisely, the intuitive idea is that ‘Jessica swims expertly’ is mapped 
to T just in case ‘expertly’ is satisfi ed by the predicate ‘swims’ when 
applied to ‘Jessica’.
It’s no exaggeration to say that this general framework is seen as a 
foundational contribution to formal semantics, even by generative lin-
guists who have no truck with—or, indeed, no awareness of—Lewis’s 
broader projects. Part of what makes Pietroski’s negative contentions 
so radical, then, is that he rejects wholesale this now-mainstream ap-
proach to semantic theorizing. In particular, he argues that taking an 
infi nite hierarchy of types as explanatorily primitive is not only unpar-
simonious, but leaves wholly unexplained crucial aspects of the natural 
languages that children invariably acquire. As a matter of empirical 
fact, humans language permits the construction of only a limited class 
of semantic types, not the infi nite range of logically possible ones. This 
empirical generalization plainly stands in need of explanation, which a 
semantic theory can’t provide if it takes all possible types as available 
to a speaker right from the start.
One can say that thinkers must have the requisite abstractive powers, 
given the capacities required to form thoughts like ABOVE(FIDO, VENUS) & 
BETWEEN (SADIE, BESSIE, VENUS). But one needs an account of these alleged 
powers—which permit abstraction of a tetradic concept from ABOVE(_, _) 
and BETWEEN(_, _, _)—to explain how thinkers can form the concepts that 
Begriffsschift expressions refl ect. This is not to doubt the utility of Frege’s 
logical syntax. On the contrary, his proposals about the architecture of 
thoughts were major contributions. But Frege insightfully invented a logi-
cal syntax whose intended interpretation raised important questions that 
he did not answer.
One can insist that given any polyadic concept with n unsaturated “slots,” a 
human thinker can use n-1 saturaters to create a monadic concept, leaving 
any one of the slots unfi lled. But that leaves the question of how we came 
to have this impressive capacity. And in chapter six, I offer evidence that 
a simple form of conjunction lies at the core of unbounded cognitive pro-
ductivity. Our natural capacities to combine concepts are impressive, but 
constrained in ways that suggest less than an ideal Fregean mind.
Pietroski recommends a more parsimonious alternative—one that es-
chews the infi nite hierarchy of semantic types and posits only a very 
small handful, including, most importantly, monadic and quasi-dyadic 
predicates. “The idea [is] that with help from Slang syntax, we can gen-
erate an analog of GIVE(VENUS, _, BESSIE) without saturating GIVE(_, _, _)
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—much less saturating it twice, or thrice, and then desaturating once” 
(103).
Nor does his iconoclasm end there. As noted earlier, Lewis’s gen-
eral framework for semantic theorizing leaves open a variety of issues 
in metaphysics and metasemantics. An equally mainstream approach 
to natural-language semantics is decidedly more committal on these 
points. Donald Davidson’s truth-theoretic semantics (Davidson, 1983), 
as well as the many variants of it that have now been developed, identi-
fi es the meanings of linguistic expressions with their extensions. Thus, 
truth conditions (perhaps relativized to possible worlds) are seen as 
the semantic values of sentences; entities are the values of singular 
terms; sets are the values of predicates; events in the case of verbs, and 
so on. Pietroski marshals a battery of arguments against this familiar 
approach. We’ll examine these shortly. For now, we note only that this 
anti-extensionalism is a core commitment that he shares with Bran-
dom. It is, therefore, a major plank in the bridge that I aim to build 
between the two in §§3-4.
2.2. Meanings are defi nitely not extensions
Pietroski sees semantics as a naturalistic inquiry into “how Slang ex-
pressions are related to human concepts” (115). Some theorists wish to 
simply identify meanings with concepts, but Pietroski points out that 
this leaves wholly unexplained the psychological processes that consti-
tute our semantic competence. I’ll argue in §4 that this point applies to 
Brandom, who sometimes speaks indiscriminately of meanings, con-
cepts, conceptual contents, intentional contents, discursive contents, 
propositional contents, and so on. However, as I’ll emphasize there, the 
difference can only be viewed as a substantive theoretical dispute if we 
let their use of the folk term ‘meaning’ bewitch us into assuming that 
they have a common explanatory target, contrary to fact.
Better, I think, to appreciate the highly theoretical nature of this 
piece of jargon and the different—but not thereby incompatible—ex-
planatory goals of the two frameworks in which it shows up. Thus, we 
can distinguish meaningB from meaningP and proceed to contemplate 
how the two are related, this now being a jointly philosophical and 
empirical question, not a boring verbal one. Indeed, this point is made 
explicitly by both Pietroski and Brandom, in connection with both 
‘meaning’ and another vexed notion—that of ‘concepts’—which notori-
ously plays a wide variety of roles in diverse research contexts. Here 
again, we can speak of conceptsB and conceptsP, aiming to articulate the 
relations between them. Likewise for ‘thought’, ‘judgment’, and other 
terms, when explicit disambiguation is required. (See also the discus-
sion of the notorious ‘-ing/-ed’ ambiguity in §4.2.)
As noted above, another popular idea is to identify meanings with 
extensions (Davidson 1983). The central negative contention of CM is 
that the notions of extension, truth, and denotation should play no ex-
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planatory role in a psychologically-oriented semantics for natural lan-
guages (“Slangs”). Pietroski argues persuasively that the best empirical 
theory of the relation between Slang expressions and concepts will not 
identify meanings with extensions. Indeed, he rejects even the weaker 
claim that meanings determine extensions. He proposes, instead, to 
identify meanings with something entirely different—in particular, 
something that can play the psychological role of relating language 
to cognition. The candidate he recommends is this: pronounceable in-
structions for accessing and assembling concepts. We’ll look at this in 
some detail, but let’s fi rst get clear on why Pietroski rejects the truth-
conditional orthodoxy that dominates formal semantics. As we’ll see, 
there are a great many reasons. To my mind, no one of these is neces-
sarily decisive, but, taken together, they strongly suggest turning away 
from the extensionalist project and starting anew, however much revi-
sion this might require. As we go along, I’ll land a few jabs of my own.
2.3. Objections to truth-conditional semantics
Pietroski views truth-conditional semantics (henceforth ‘TCS’) as an 
empirical hypothesis about Slang expressions, according to which there 
is a relation—call it “true of”, “refers to”, “denotes”, or whatever you 
like—that holds between words and items in the world. TCS views this 
relation as being of central importance to our theoretical characteriza-
tion of natural-language meanings. In rejecting this hypothesis, one 
need not deny, of course, that there are words or that there objects (e.g., 
babies and ‘bathwater’). One can, instead, deny that there is a unique 
relation between them, let alone one that’s suited to playing the theo-
retical role of linguistic meaning. Here is how Pietroski puts the point:
I don’t think ‘sky’ is true of skies (or of sky), much less blue skies or night 
skies. I don’t deny that there are chases, and that in this sense, chases exist 
even if skies don’t. But the existence of chases doesn’t show that ‘chase’ is 
true of them… [Likewise], there is no entity that ‘Venice’ denotes. In this 
respect, ‘Venice’ is like ‘Vulcan’, even though one can visit Venice but not 
Vulcan… I also agree that there is a sense in which there are blue skies, but 
no blue unicorns. But it doesn’t follow that ‘sky’ is true of some things, at 
least not in the sense of ‘true’ that matters for a theory of truth… [T]here is 
no call to quantify over skies, in physics or linguistics. (68)
As the example of ‘Vulcan’ illustrates, words can perfectly well be 
meaningful without having extensions. Pietroski’s view is that this 
holds of all Slang expressions. What’s interesting about words like 
‘Vulcan’ is they “illustrate the general point that words don’t have ex-
tensions”. The idea isn’t merely such terms have empty extensions; it’s 
that they have none at all.
Even if words did have extensions, the latter couldn’t be identifi ed 
with meanings, if only because “expressions with different meanings 
can have the same ‘extension’” (15). Fans of TCS will typically appeal 
to “non-actual possibilities” in dealing with this issue. For instance, 
‘unicorn’ and ‘ghost’ are said to have the same extension in the actual 
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world, but they differ in meaning—the reply goes—because they have 
different extensions in other possible worlds. Pietroski correctly points 
out that this “is an odd way to maintain that meanings are extensions.”
If the meaning of a word is not whatever set of things that the word hap-
pens to be true of, why think the meaning is a mapping from each possible 
world w to whatever set of things that the word happens to be true of at w? 
[If] Slang expressions need not connect pronunciations to actual things, it 
seems contrived to insist that these expressions connect pronunciations to 
possible things… [I]nvoking possible unicorns is contrivance on stilts. (12)
Doubtless, fans of TCS will see this as little more than an ad hominem. 
We’ll look at stronger arguments shortly. For now, I want to emphasize 
that this point—or, in any case, a version of it—carries more weight 
than is commonly appreciated. Let me take a brief aside to develop it 
in my own terms.
The intuitive considerations that motivate TCS (e.g., for introduc-
tory semantics students) almost always have to do with objects that 
are available for perceptual inspection. (‘David’ refers to this guy, ‘my 
desk’ refers to that thing, and so on.) This serves to illustrate, at the 
level of pre-theoretical intuition, how linguistic expressions “hook onto 
the world”—namely by way of perceptual contact (indeed, literal con-
tact, in the case of haptic perception). Shortly thereafter, the details of 
one or another formal theory are introduced, giving the student little 
time to refl ect on how far the initial illustration can plausibly gener-
alize. (Spoiler alert: not very far!) If philosophical questions happen 
to arise about the status of these “reference” and “correspondence” 
“relations”—e.g., with regard to empty names and predicates (‘Vulcan’, 
‘unicorn’, etc.)—the instructor can use the opportunity to explore vari-
ous technical proposals for dealing with such “special cases”—e.g., Rus-
sell’s theory of names as disguised descriptions, or the formal appara-
tus of possible-worlds semantics. Attention is thus defl ected away from 
how massive the intuitive problem really is. Here’s a much-needed cor-
rective.
Consider for a moment the vast range of expressions that we can 
readily produce and comprehend, and refl ect on how vanishingly few of 
these have anything much to do with what’s going on in physical real-
ity, let alone with things that we can perceptually inspect in any intui-
tive sense. We speak of Santa and his elves, gods and demons, goals 
and fears, opportunities and temptations, aliens and chem-trails, rep-
tiles and unicorns, futures and fi ctions, numbers and functions, nouns 
and verbs, fonts and meanings, haircuts and fi eld-goals, stocks and de-
rivatives, mergers and monopolies, economies and governments, boson 
fi elds and spin-foams, black holes and electrons, Blacks and whites, 
Jews and Frenchmen, London and Moscow, classes and genders, pro-
tests and stereotypes, jocks and nerds, bits and bytes, poems and op-
eras, humor and beauty, and even the possibility (albeit dim) of true 
liberatory justice.
340 D. Pereplyotchik, Generative Linguistics Meets Normative
Appreciating the sheer scope of the phenomenon to be explained 
renders, to my mind, utterly implausible the strategy of taking direct 
perceptual contact with the world as our model of how language relates 
to reality in general. Moreover, the total lack of convergence that we 
fi nd amongst metasemanticists when we go looking for a metaphysical 
account of truth and reference—conceived of, again, as a Very Special 
sort of natural relation—strikes me as further grounds for abandon-
ing the project of extensional semantics immediately and forthwith. It 
helps, of course, that Pietroski supplies a powerful alternative frame-
work for doing semantics. And it certainly doesn’t hurt, that Brandom 
complements this with an independently attractive (“defl ationist”) ac-
count of truth and reference.
All that aside, Pietroski has a further, more powerful argument 
against invoking non-actual possibilities for the purpose of individu-
ating meanings. He makes use of Kripke’s contention that the non-
existence of unicorns in the actual world implies their non-existence in 
all other possible worlds (Kripke, 1980). Of course, there may well be 
creatures in other possible worlds that look a lot like what we imagine 
unicorns would look like. But they would not thereby be unicorns, and 
our word ‘unicorn’ would not thereby be true of them. If that’s correct, 
then ‘ghost’ and ‘unicorn’ aren’t just co-extensive in our world; they’re 
co-extensive in every possible world. Thus, no identifi cation of mean-
ings with extensions, actual or possible, will distinguish the meanings 
of those two words. Likewise for all of the related cases—empty names, 
defective predicates, necessary falsehoods, and so on.
One might reply by rejecting Kripke’s semantic and metaphysical 
assumptions, and adopting instead a Lewisian counterpart theory, but 
Pietroski points out several problems for this strategy as well. Adopt-
ing the terms ‘LUNICORN’ for Lewisian unicorn-lookalikes and ‘KU-
NICORN’ for the whatever it is that Kripke has in mind, he makes the 
following powerful retort.
We can grant that some theorists sometimes use ‘unicorn’ to express the 
technical concept LUNICORN. But if ‘unicorn’ can also be used to express 
the concept KUNICORN, then it seems like contrivance to insist that the 
Slang expression has a meaning that maps some contexts onto the exten-
sion of LUNICORN and other contexts onto the extension of KUNICORN. 
If we assume that words like ‘possibly’ have extensions, then perhaps we 
should specify the meanings of such words in terms of a suitably generic 
notion of world that allows for special cases corresponding to metaphysical 
and epistemic modalities; cp. Kratzer. But in my view, theorists should not 
posit (things that include) unicorns in order to accommodate correct uses 
of ‘Possibly/Perhaps/Maybe unicorns exist’ or ‘There may be unicorns’; and 
likewise for squarable circles.
Thereafter, the dialectic turns to matters that we need not enter into 
here. Suffi ce it to say that, even if this worry about fi ne-grained mean-
ings can ultimately be defused, TCS would still face Pietroski’s more 
technical (and potentially more damaging) objections. These include 
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matters pertaining to liar-sentences, as well as the more widespread 
and natural phenomenon of event descriptions. These too go beyond the 
scope of our discussion. One argument that I do want to say a bit more 
about, though, is on the topic of polysemy, where Pietroski’s view of 
the matter fi nds wide acceptance among generative linguists—though, 
notably, not philosophers of language (see, e.g., Michael Devitt’s paper 
in this issue.)
Following Chomsky (2000), Pietroski points out that ‘water’ is poly-
semously used to talk about many substances—those found in wells, 
rivers, taps, etc.—nearly all of which have lower H2O contents than 
substances that, at least prima facie, are not water, including coffee, 
tea, and cola (CM, 21). This presents a challenge to theories that view 
‘water’ as bearing a reference relation to (all instances of?) the natural 
kind water, whose metaphysically essential property is being composed 
of H2O molecules (Kripke, 1980). If coffee, tea, and cola all have more 
H2O in them than most ordinary instances of water, then it’s not clear 
why ‘water’ doesn’t bear the reference relation to them, rather to the 
stuff in the local rivers and wells.
A related consideration has to do with predicate conjunction. 
The word ‘France’ can be used in expressing either of two concepts: 
FRANCE:BORDER and FRANCE:POLIS. The border is hexagonal and the polis 
is a republic. But, Pietroski points out, the polysemy of ‘France’ “does 
not imply that something is both hexagonal and a republic, much less 
that ‘France’ denotes such a thing” (74). Similarly, while ‘London’ can 
be used to talk about “a particular location or a polis that could be re-
located elsewhere,” it is plain that “no location can be moved, and no 
political institution is a location.” Pietroski concludes that “no entity is 
the denotation (or ‘semantic value’) of ‘London’; the ordinary word has 
no denotation” (73, emphasis mine).
2.4. Meanings as pronounceable instructions
Let’s turn now to Pietroski’s positive views. As noted earlier, the main 
goal of CM is to defend the hypothesis that linguistic meanings are 
“pronounceable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts” 
(1). More specifi cally,
each lexical meaning is an instruction for how to access a concept from a 
certain address, which may be shared by a family of concepts. … A Slang 
expression Σ can be used to access/build/express a concept C that is less 
fl exible than Σ—in terms of what Σ can be used to talk about, and how it can 
combine with other expressions, compared with what C can be used to think 
about and how it can combine with other concepts— since Σ might be used 
to access/build/express a related but distinct concept C* .
Unpacking Pietroski’s hypothesis requires getting clear on the three 
key notions of pronounceable instructions, compositional assembly, and 
conceptual types. Each is more challenging than the last, so we’ll start 
with instructions and work our way up.
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2.4.1. Pronounceable instructions
An utterance of a sentence is a spatiotemporally located event, in which 
a speaker produces a physical signal. The latter serves, on Pietroski’s 
view, as an instruction for the hearer’s FL to perform a computational 
procedure.18 The instruction can be carried out by any hearer whose 
I-language is suffi ciently similar to the speaker’s. The acoustic proper-
ties of an utterance, upon being transduced, trigger an early perceptu-
al constancy effect, whereby a dedicated module imposes phonological 
categories on the neural encoding of the acoustic blast. These cognitive 
operations serve, in turn, as instructions for the further segmentation 
of the phonological units into syllables and eventually into morphemes 
and other lexical items. The latter, on Pietroski’s view are best seen 
as instructions for accessing (“fetching”) individual concepts, which he 
conceives of as atomic units of one or another language of thought. I say 
“one or another” because his view leaves open the possibility, which he 
goes on to explore and even endorse, that there are many languages 
in which the mind conducts its information-processing. We’ll return 
to this point in connection with Pietroski’s discussions of Frege (§2.5).
Importantly, Pietroski maintains that concepts reside in semantic 
“families”, which have their own “addresses” in a broader cognitive 
architecture. This is a large part of his explanation of the aforemen-
tioned phenomenon of polysemy. The idea is that one and the same 
lexical item can be an instruction for fetching “a concept from a certain 
lexical address … shared by a family of concepts” (8). Because a lexical 
instruction points only at an address, rather than a specifi c concept, 
it’s left open for downstream processing routines to determine which 
particular concept from the indicated address/family is “relevant” in 
the present context.
This, of course, raises deep and diffi cult questions about how 
hearers manage this latter step—i.e., reliably accessing the relevant 
concept(s) in a given context, rather than the irrelevant ones from the 
same conceptual family. What psychological mechanisms select just 
one of a family of concepts residing at a common lexical address? In 
large part, Pietroski leaves this issue open—justifi ably so, given ev-
erything else he’s juggling. But it’s worth remarking in the present 
context that the mechanisms of this kind of selection are widely agreed 
to involve—indeed, to require—precisely the kind of nondemonstrative 
pragmatic reasoning that Brandom has argued to be constitutive of 
conceptual contents.
18 “I hope the analogy to elementary computer programs, which can be compiled 
and implemented, makes the operative notion of instruction tolerably clear and 
unobjectionable in the present context. … Instructions can take many forms, 
including strings of ‘0’s and ‘1’s that get used—as in a von Neumann machine—to 
access other such strings and perform certain operations on them. … And instead of 
arithmetic operations that are performed on numbers, one can imagine combinatorial 
operations that are performed on concepts” (108).
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2.4.2. Assembling concepts
Turn now to the second key notion in Pietroski’s main hypothesis—
viz., the compositional assembly of concepts. In general, instructions 
for assembling something can vary along any number of dimensions. 
Some are clear; some aren’t. Some are detailed; others are vague. Some 
are simple; others are complex—i.e., composed of simpler instructions. 
Moreover, not everything to which an instruction is presented is ca-
pable of carrying it out. Some computers can’t run the software that 
others can. Some chefs can’t bake the cakes that others have no trouble 
baking. And some proteins (or cells) can follow genetic instructions that 
others simply can’t. Lastly, the products of successfully carrying out 
instructions can vary widely. The same student, with the same instruc-
tions, can succeed or fail on an exam, depending on whether they’ve 
had sleep the night before. Likewise, a novice barista will generally 
make worse coffee with low-quality ingredients than with high-quality 
ones, successfully following the same instructions both times.
Given that the semantic module of FL is assumed to have a stable 
processing routines, carried out in a proprietary representational for-
mat, it follows that it won’t be able to process just any old instruction, 
but only a restricted kind. Likewise, it will only be capable of assem-
bling only a limited class of outputs. The question, then, is what kinds 
of instructions the semantic module is capable of implementing and 
what sort of structures it’s capable of building.
Many theorists aim at capturing something called “composi tio-
nality”—a piece of theoretical jargon that, perhaps more than most, 
has been worn smooth by a thousand tongues (to use Wilfrid Sellars’s 
clever phrase). Of the many ways of cashing it out, Pietroski main-
tains that what’s required for an avowedly cognitivist project is that 
the meanings of lexical items compose in ways that suitably mirror the 
structure of complex concepts. Thus, having identifi ed the meanings of 
lexical items with instructions to fetch individual concepts, he argues 
that these instructions compose, forming complex instructions, with 
some functioning as (detachable) components of others. These seman-
tic instructions—what Pietroski calls Begriffsplans—are responsible 
for the assembly of concepts meet two constraints. First, they must be 
suited to that specifi c type of instruction. While other kinds of human 
concepts might be assembled by non-linguistic means, Begriffsplans 
can only assemble concepts of a very specifi c nature (to be spelled out 
shortly). Second, in keeping with the “mirroring” constraint (my word, 
not his), the complex concepts that Begriffsplans assemble must bear 
the same part-whole relationships to one another as do the Begriffs-
plans themselves.
Laying out some of the specifi cs of the Begriffsplans that Pietroski 
posits will put us in a position to better appreciate his views on con-
cepts. The clearest case of this pertains to instructions for predicate 
conjunction. Pietroski takes this to be an absolutely central aspect of 
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linguistic concept assembly, in part because he holds that the kinds of 
concepts that the human FL is capable of assembling are uniformly 
predicative. In saying this, he means to deny outright that natural lan-
guages (“Slangs”) allow us to access singular concepts. Such concepts 
do exist, he thinks, but they can’t be fetched by Begriffsplans. Indeed, 
he holds that the only predicative concepts FL can fetch, and hence 
assemble, are limited to just the monadic and the quasi-dyadic, with 
higher adicities receiving a different analysis. These two types of con-
cept correspond to two fl avors of predicate conjunction: M-junction and 
D-junction. Here’s how Pietroski characterizes the overall process.
If biology somehow implements M-junction and D-junction, one can envi-
sion a mind with further capacities to (i) use lexical items as devices for 
accessing simple concepts that can be inputs to these operations, and (ii) 
combine lexical items in ways that invoke these operations. … Suppose that 
combining two Slang expressions, atomic or complex, is an instruction to 
send a pair of corresponding concepts to a “joiner” whose outputs can be 
inputs to further operations of joining. Imagine a mind—call it Joyce—that 
has some lexical items, each with a long-term address that may be shared 
by two or more polysemously related concepts. Joyce also has a workspace 
in which (copies of) two concepts can be either M-joined or D-joined to form 
a single monadic concept, thereby making room for another concept in the 
workspace, up to some limit. Joyce can produce and execute instructions 
like fetch@‘cow’; where for each lexical item L, the instruction fetch@L is 
executed by copying a concept that resides at the long-term address of L 
into the workspace. Joyce can also produce and execute instructions of the 
forms M-join[I, I0] and D-join[I, I0]; where I and I0 are also generable in-
structions. An instance of M-join[I, I0] is executed by M-joining results of 
executing I and I0, leaving the result in the workspace, and likewise for an 
instance D-join[I, I0].
Having introduced two basic types of composable Begriffsplans—one for 
fetching concepts like DOG(_) and one for assembling these into complex 
structures—Pietroski adds four other types of basic semantic operation:
(i) a limited operation of existential closure
(ii) a mental analog of relative clause formation (weaker than 
λ-abstraction)
(iii) the introduction of concepts like GIVE(_) on the basis of GIVE(x, y, z)
(iv) of thematic concepts—e.g., AGENT(_), PATIENT(_), RECIPIENT(_)
[G]iven two monadic concepts, the operation of M-junction yields a third 
such concept that applies to an entity e if and only if each of the two con-
stituent concepts applies to e. (32) … In short, Slangs let us access and as-
semble monadic [and some limited dyadic] concepts that can be conjoined, 
indexed, polarized, and used as bases for a limited kind of abstraction.
We’ll look at several of these operations in more detail below, but the 
following passage contains an initial illustration of the kinds of struc-
tures that this system can assemble.
My claim is not that ‘gave a dog a bone’ is an instruction to build [just 
any] concept with which one can think about things that gave a dog a bone. 
That instruction might be executed by building the concept ∃y∃z[GAVE(x, 
 D. Pereplyotchik, Generative Linguistics Meets Normative 345
y, z) & BONE(y) & DOG(z)], which has a triadic constituent. My claim is that 
‘gave a dog a bone’ is an instruction for how to build an M-junction like 
[[GIVE(_)^PAST(_)]^∃[PATIENT(_, _), BONE(_)]]^∃[RECIPIENT (_, _)
^DOG(_)], which has only an occasional dyadic concept that has been 
“sealed in.”
This passage usefully contrasts the conceptual structures assembled 
by FL with the those that are often assumed by linguists—wrongly, by 
Pietroski’s lights—to be available to humans antecedent to the develop-
ment of language.
2.4.3. Concepts, predicative and sentential
We are now in a position to ask more specifi c questions about Pietroski’s 
third key notion—viz., that of a concept. As we’ve already seen, he takes 
these to be expressions in a compositional language of thought, some of 
which can be assembled by the semantic module of FL. But, however 
they might be assembled, they are the representations that allow us to 
think about the world.
[C]oncepts have contents that can be described as ways of thinking about 
things; cf. Evans. A concept that can be used to think about something as 
a rabbit, whatever that amounts to, has a content that we can gesture at 
by talking about the concept type RABBIT. An instance of this type is a men-
tal symbol that can be used to think about a rabbit as such, or to classify 
something—perhaps wrongly—as a rabbit; see Fodor. A concept of the type 
RABBIT-THAT-RAN, which can be used think about something as a rabbit that 
ran, is presumably a complex mental symbol whose constituents include an 
instance of RABBIT. A thought can be described as a sentential concept that 
lets us think about (some portion of) the universe as being a certain way. 
Thoughts of the type A-RABBIT-RAN can be used to think about the world as 
being such that a rabbit ran. (4)
As the remarks at the end of this passage indicate, Pietroski takes 
thoughts to be a special kind of concept—namely, a sentential concept. 
This is important to highlight, in view of its relation to a broader point 
about sentential meanings.
Pietroski is skeptical that “Slangs generate sentences as such.” The 
traditional notion of a sentence, as a unity of a subject and a predicate, 
has been roundly abandoned in contemporary linguistics. While the no-
tions of “subject” and “sentence” have a place in subject-predicate con-
ceptions of thought, Pietroski points out that they “may have no stable 
place” in contemporary scientifi c grammars (114).
Linguists have replaced “S” with many phrase-like projections of functional 
items that include tense and agreement morphemes, along with various 
complementizers. This raises questions about what sentences are, and 
whether any grammatical notion corresponds to the notion of a truth-eval-
uable thought. But theories of grammatical structure—and to that extent, 
theories of the expressions that Slangs generate—have been improved by 
not positing a special category of sentence. So while such a category often 
plays a special role in the stipulations regarding invented formal languages, 
grammatical structure may be independent of any notion of sentence. (61)
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Accordingly, Pietroski suspects that talk of “grammatical subjects” is 
just a roundabout way of “saying that tensed clauses have a ‘left edge 
constituent’ that somehow makes them complete sentences—whatever 
that amounts to—as opposed to mere phrases like ‘telephoned Bing-
ley’” (87). Rather than clarifying the notion of a “complete sentence,” 
Pietroski points out that talk of grammatical subjects presupposes it.
How, then, to characterize sentences? Naturally, Pietroski does not 
appeal to a distinction between sentential truth conditions and sub-
sentential satisfaction conditions. Instead, he develops a novel version 
of predicativism, according to which all of the concepts assembled by 
Begriffsplans are predicative, in the sense that they all have a clas-
sifi catory function. This includes concepts that are fetched by linguistic 
expressions like ‘Jessica’, ‘David Pereplyotchik’, and ‘Reykjavík’. (Yes, 
the Reykjavík.)
So far, the view on the table is a version of the familiar predicativ-
ist position that was introduced by Quine (1970), defended by Burge 
(1973), and reanimated in contemporary discussions by the work of De-
lia Graff Fara (2005). Pietroski goes on, however, to make a quite novel 
claim—namely, that the concepts assembled by sentence-sized Slang 
expressions are also predicative.
The idea is that familiar subsentential predicates are assembled, 
largely via predicate conjunction, and then a new mental operation (⇑ 
or ⇓) converts the results into a sentential predicate—what Pietroski 
calls a “polarized concept”. Here is how he defi nes these: “Given any 
concept M, applying the operation ⇑ yields a polarized concept, ⇑M, 
that applies to each thing if M applies to something” (30). For instance, 
if RABBIT applies to something, then ⇑RABBIT applies to each thing and ⇓RABBIT applies to no-thing. We will return to this topic in §3, when 
we compare this proposal with the inferentialist account of sentence 
meaning.
Recall that semantic instructions (Begriffsplans) have “mechanical 
execution conditions”. Because Pietroski takes Begriffsplans to be lin-
guistic meanings, it follows for him that that “meanings satisfy demand-
ing compositionality constraints.” Such constraints, he argues, permit 
the assembly of concepts that are better suited for their role in language 
use than for the epistemic role of “fi tting the world”. This important 
upshot of Pietroski’s view bears on his rejection of both Davidson’s ex-
tensional semantics and Lewis’s unrestricted type-theoretic approach to 
natural language (§2.1). For, although he leaves it open that we might 
build truth-evaluable thoughts as a side-effect of language processing, 
he denies that “meanings are instructions for how to build concepts that 
exhibit classical semantic properties” (115). Likewise, he suspects that 
“most natural concepts [do not] have extensions; cp. Travis… if only 
because of vagueness; cp. Sainsbury” (9). Hence, the Begriffsplans that 
Pietroski identifi es with meanings “make no reference to the things we 
usually think and talk about” (115). If correct, this conclusion is just one 
more nail in the coffi n of the extensionalist project.
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2.5. Pietroski on Fregean thoughts and concepts
Common to both Pietroski and Brandom is a deep engagement with 
the work of Frege. However, as we’ll see presently, the lessons that 
Pietroski draws from Frege are not those that one might expect. In 
particular, the formal device that he takes over from Frege’s semantics 
is not that of function application, as is common; rather, he emphasizes 
Frege’s immensely useful notion of concept invention—something you 
don’t hear much about in discussions of Frege, at least amongst lin-
guists.
As noted earlier, Pietroski holds that are multiple languages of 
thought—i.e., distinct formats of concept application. In his discussions 
of Frege, he advances the hypothesis that there are, in fact, at least 
two such languages. The fi rst one, in order of evolutionary history, may 
well have a Fregean semantics and include expressions of type <t>. 
The second one, which only came in with the evolution of natural lan-
guage, consists of concepts that were invented, or introduced, in a Fre-
gean sense, on the basis of the older ones.
[N]atural sentences of type <t> may belong to languages of thought that are 
phylogenetically older than Slangs. Expressions of these newer languages 
may be used to build complex monadic concepts, perhaps including some 
special cases that are closely related to natural thoughts of type <t>. In 
which case, the very idea of a truth-conditional semantics for a human lan-
guage may be fundamentally misguided. (114)
Because Pietroski treats the new type of concept as being invariably 
predicative—i.e., functioning semantically to classify things into cat-
egories, not to denote them individually—he calls such concepts “cat-
egorical”. The older type of concept, which participates in thoughts of 
type <t>, includes singular denoting concepts and predicates of any 
adicity. On account of their semantic function of relating items to each 
other, Pietroski calls such concepts (and the thoughts they participate 
in) “relational”.
Though I see its signifi cance, I’m not, myself, a huge fan of the 
‘categorical’/‘relational’ terminology. Adverting to their historical roles, 
rather than their internal logic, I’ll call these languages Olde Mental-
ese and New Mentalese for the remainder of the discussion. Here’s how 
Pietroski casts the theoretical relations between them.
Frege assumed that we naturally think and talk in a subject-predicate for-
mat, and that we need help—[e.g.] his invented Begriffsschrift—in order to 
use our rudimentary capacities for relational thought in systematic ways… 
The idea was that a thought content can be “dimly grasped,” in some natu-
ral way, and then re-presented in a more logically perspicuous format that 
highlights inferential relations to other contents… I think this is basically 
right: our categorical thoughts are governed by a natural logic that lets us 
appreciate certain implication relations among predicates; but our relation-
al concepts are related in less systematic ways. We use relational concepts 
in natural modes of thought. (95-6) 
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The distinction between Olde Mentalese and New Mentalese allows 
Pietroski clarify his perspective, contrasting it with Frege’s. Here, too, 
it’s instructive to quote at length.
Frege introduced higher-order polyadic analogs of monadic concepts. In this 
respect, my project is the converse of his. Frege invented logically interest-
ing concepts, and he viewed monadicity as a kind of relation to truth, as 
part of a project in logic that prescinds from many details of human psy-
chology. I think humans naturally use concepts of various adicities to in-
troduce logically boring predicative analogs. But I adopt Frege’s idea that 
available concepts can be used to introduce formally new ones, and that this 
can be useful for certain derivational purposes. Frege “unpacked” monadic 
concepts like NUMBER(_), in ways that let him exploit the power of his sophis-
ticated polyadic logic to derive arithmetic axioms from (HP). I am suggest-
ing that Slangs let us use antecedently available concepts— many of which 
are polyadic—to introduce concepts like CHASE(_) and GIVE(_), which can be 
combined in simple ways that allow for simple inferences like conjunction 
reduction. But the big idea, which I am applying to the study of Slangs, is 
Fregean: languages are not mere tools for expressing available concepts; 
they can be used to introduce formally new concepts that are useful given 
certain computational capacities and limitations. This is why I have dwelt 
so long on Frege’s project. For while the idea of concept introduction was 
important for Frege, it is not the aspect of his work that semanticists typi-
cally draw on.
The gory details of Frege’s technical devices for concept introduction 
are, mercifully, beyond our present needs; only a few key points are rel-
evant. One is that introducing concepts need not be seen on the model 
of explicit defi nition. Rather, Pietroski highlights Frege’s proposal for 
a second way of introducing concepts—viz., by inventing them. Simi-
larly, although analyzing a concept has often been seen as breaking it 
down into its more basic defi nitional constituents, Pietroski joins Fodor 
(1970) in rejecting the idea that lexicalized concepts will generally ad-
mit of such analytic defi nitions. Nevertheless, there is an alternative 
way of analyzing concepts, which Pietroski characterizes as “a creative 
activity” (emphasis mine).
Given a very fi ne-grained notion of content, or thought-equivalence, analy-
sis may not be possible. But Frege employed at least two notions of content: 
one based on his notion of sense (Sinn), and another according to which 
thoughts are equivalent if each follows from the other. Given the latter 
notion, or Lewis’s characterization of contents as sets of logically possible 
worlds, one can say that our current representations are not yet perspicu-
ous. We can use our concepts to ask questions that lead us to reformulate 
the questions in ways that allow for interesting answers. From this per-
spective, analysis can be a creative activity whose aim is not to depict our 
current representations…
It’s in virtue of our ability to invent new concepts that we, qua humans 
endowed with a specifi c FL, have invented the monadic and quasi-dy-
adic concepts that arise only for language use. This includes not only 
monadic event-predicates like GIVE(_), invented on the basis of the older 
triadic concept GIVE(x, y, z), but also—importantly for Pietroski’s pur-
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poses, though not ours—thematic concepts such as AGENT(_), PATIENT(_), 
and RECIPIENT(_).
2.6. Summary
The generativist methodology that animates Pietroski’s inquiry leads 
him to a number of strikingly original claims about concepts and a de-
tailed theory of meanings. Treating the latter in a resolutely naturalist 
fashion, he maintains that their theoretical role is to mediate between 
pronunciations and concepts—i.e., to effect the psychological operations 
that constitute the interface between language (FL) and the “conceptu-
al-intentional system” (to use Chomsky’s coinage). Although meanings 
facilitate the assembly of concepts, which have intentional contents, Pi-
etroski holds that meanings are neither concepts nor their contents.
On this view, the relation between truth and conceptual/intentional 
content is “quite complicated and orthogonal to the central issues con-
cerning how meanings compose” (115). This, among the many other 
reasons surveyed above, leads Pietroski to abandon Davidson’s project 
of extensional truth-conditional semantics. Moreover, the goal of ex-
plaining our access to a productive hierarchy of concepts, rather than 
merely stipulating it, underlies his rejection of the type-theoretic ap-
proach championed by Lewis (1970)—one of the many disagreements 
that we’ll look at in the next section.
The semantic theory that satisfi es Pietroski’s methodological com-
mitments—as well as the compositionality constraints that he argues 
follow from it—treats meanings as composable instructions for concept 
assembly. The instructions are “composable” in the sense that their 
basic constituents—namely, fetch@ and join[I, I’]—can enter into part-
whole relations to one another. Moreover, as noted earlier, the larger 
structures they compose will, in a defi nite sense, mirror those of the 
concepts that the instructions assemble.
Having furnished empirical evidence for the idea that these “Beg-
riffsplans” reduce largely to two fl avors of predicate conjunction, Pi-
etroski adopts a strong version of predicativism, according to which all 
of the concepts that natural language allows us to access and assemble 
are predicative. This includes not only the concepts fetched by linguis-
tic expressions that have traditionally been classed as predicates, but 
also those that have generally been seen as differing in some impor-
tant respect—including singular terms and, more strikingly, even sen-
tences. The conceptual predicates that meanings allow us to access and 
assemble thus all either monadic, dyadic (in a restricted sense), or “po-
larized”, where the latter kind is assembled by sentence-like linguistic 
expressions, using specialized mental operations, ⇑ and ⇓, to “polar-
ize” concepts. Importantly, the resulting conceptual structures are not 
necessarily ones that best “fi t the world”, and they’re not even the only 
ones we can deploy in thought. But, if Pietroski is correct, the they are 
the only ones that FL can assemble.
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Denying that the concepts involved in language use have denota-
tional properties and relational structures (of arbitrary adicity) leaves 
open whether other concepts might have these features. As we saw, Pi-
etroski hypothesizes that there are in fact such concepts, and that they 
belong to a phylogenetically older language of thought than the one FL 
allows us to access—what I’ve dubbed ‘Olde Mentalese’. Olde thoughts 
might have a subject-predicate form, a Fregean semantics, and belong 
to the semantic type <t>.
Pietroski goes on to make novel use of Frege’s notion of concept in-
vention in explaining the (non-defi nitional) mental introduction of new 
concepts on the basis of the Olde ones—specifi cally, the ones that FL 
allows us to access/assemble (New Mentalese). This psychological pro-
cess, he argues, serves to introduce GIVE(_) on the basis of GIVE(x, y, z), 
as well as novel thematic concepts such as AGENT(_), PATIENT(_). These, 
in turn, participate in building polarized sentential concepts, such as ⇑RABBIT, which “applies to each thing if RABBIT applies to something”. 
In the course of assembling such concepts, it may happen—but only as 
a side-effect (fortuitous or otherwise)—that we also token thoughts of 
Olde Mentalese. But the details of how Olde Mentalese thoughts func-
tions are, Pietroski rightly holds, beyond the scope of a naturalistic 
semantic inquiry into human language.
Conclusion of Part 1
We’ve now surveyed the core commitments of two large-scale theoreti-
cal frameworks in the philosophy of language and seen some of the 
ways in which they play out in the realm of semantics, including in de-
tailed analyses of various linguistic constructions. It may appear that 
the two views are so different in substance and overall methodology 
that a conversation between the two is unlikely to bear much fruit. In 
fact, I suspect this is a large part of why so few conversations of this 
kind ever take place. In Part 2 of this essay (next issue), I’ll argue for 
a contrary perspective, outlining an ecumenical approach that seeks to 
integrate the two in a variety of ways. In surveying what I take to be 
signifi cant points of convergence—which then serve as background for 
constraining residual disputes—I rebuff various superfi cial objections 
to the possibility of integration. In each case, I show how the theoreti-
cal differences that they point to can be reconciled without doing much 
(if any) violence to either view.
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